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Obviously HTTPS needs to be implemented correctly. But this is more a problem with the knee jerk HTTPS everywhere movement and a quick and dirty response than
by Spooky23 10y ago
Obviously HTTPS needs to be implemented correctly.
But this is more a problem with the knee jerk HTTPS everywhere movement and a quick and dirty response than anything else. The browser and OS vendors don't provide high quality APIs for this purpose, so customers are stuck picking security products without an easy way to identify quality gaps.
Even in unregulated industries, most commercial enterprises should be doing TLS inspection -- i would argue that's it is irresponsible not to. How can you claim to protect customer data or respect customer privacy without looking at the data flowing out the front door?
- jstanley 10y ago> I would argue that's it is irresponsible not to Please do so. Please present a compelling argument for why, in the general case, it is irresponsible not to spy on your employees.
- pilif 10y agoWhile there's the potential of spying, there's also the much more common use-case of AV scanning the whole stream but otherwise not looking at it and not archiving it anywhere. Now we can all debate the value of AV scanning in general (I'm on the probably-not-worth-it-and-way-too-risky side), but if we attribute any kind of value to AV scanning (it might help with wide-spread attacks at the cost of facilitating targeted attacks), then being able to peek into SSL tunnels is a requirement for it to provide any kind of its proposed value. Depending on your users level of knowledge and your updating procedure, not running AV might indeed be considered irresponsible. If your systems are somewhat unpatched and your users oblivious to threats, then you're much more likely to be owned by and wide-spread malvertising and email spam attack (both of which AV actually protect against) than you're likely to be the victim of a targeted attack (which AV actually makes easier to pull off) just by virtue of the former being much more common than the latter.
- jcrawfordor 10y agoIn real corporate environments (where, keep in mind, most users are very non-sophisticated), this kind of inline scanning is extremely valuable. TLS intercepted data is also invaluable for post-incident investigation, for example, to determine whether or not a host A/V detection is likely valid without having to go through a costly and disruptive host forensics process (typically by grabbing the file out of retained data, or just by determining where the file actually came from). In fact, without TLS interception, post-incident investigation based on network artifacts is becoming more and more impractical as malicious actors are taking advantage of LetsEncrypt and CloudFlare to HTTPS protect their delivery and C2.
- anoother 10y agoI think they did: > How can you claim to protect customer data or respect customer privacy without looking at the data flowing out the front door?
- cmdrfred 10y agoWhy can your employees access resources that aren't approved in the first place? Considering their machine contains such sensitive information, that seems irresponsible.
- eropple 10y agoBecause some of those employees are database administrators and business analysts. Because others are customer service reps. Because how do you do a job without the data required to do a job?
- jerf 10y agoWho said they're not approved? People get approval to access all sorts of things that they aren't supposed to let out of the company. Or may be obligated to take certain steps to ensure that it's not just on the good graces of the employees to ensure doesn't get out. There's no squaring the circle here. You can not lay obligations on corporations to secure their stuff, but not permit them to have any tools that allow them to actually implement that security, and expect security to be the result. You can't assume that all employees of all companies everywhere that deal with sensitive information are solely staffed by angels, especially in light of the fact that the very fact that they deal with sensitive information can attract people who deceptively pose as employees long enough to get their hands on this information.
- 3pt14159 10y agoI agree with jerf here. In many cases I think the answer should be to create certain systems that are almost always offline (say after installation). We shouldn't be connecting the same computers that hold health records to the network that the doctor is checking Ask MD in the back office.
- taf2 10y agoSorry I'm not sure I understand - how can you do TLS inspection without breaking the security promise TLS is supposed to provide?
- jstanley 10y agoIf you trust your proxy, and your software trusts your proxy's self-signed CA, then your proxy can MITM the connections and sign its own certificates, and you still know nobody "else" is listening.
- jcrawfordor 10y agoIt depends on who you trust. TLS inspection will break the security promise of TLS in a sense because your trust chain is no longer exclusively the operator of the website. However, the 'extra link' in that trust chain can be someone that you trust, for example an employer or trusted vendor. In this case, well implemented TLS interception changes the situation from "I trust google.com" to "I trust my employer and google.com", with proper cryptographic verification of both of those steps.
- Spooky23 10y agoThe owner of the computer and network can choose to trust itself, intercept traffic, and reencrypt using an organizational key.
- pilif 10y ago> But this is more a problem with the knee jerk HTTPS everywhere movement and a quick and dirty response than anything else not really HTTPS interception by AV programs and corporate proxies is common since the mid 90ies. What did happen because of the HTTPS everywhere movement is that this bad practice is finally coming to light and being scrutinised. What we need is for AV programs and proxies to actually do proper certificate validation and to not downgrade security on the public end of the tunnel. If they can't do that, then we might actually be better off with them not existing than with the status quo.
- pjc50 10y agoHow on earth do you identify the illegitimately outflowing data in the vast soup of data being emitted from the browser? Do you have a magic key that lets you decode Microsoft telemetry, for example? Surely the real solution here if you insist is to not pretend that you've got real HTTPS but to block 80/443 altogether and make applications use a proxy.
- jcrawfordor 10y ago> How on earth do you identify the illegitimately outflowing data in the vast soup of data being emitted from the browser? Do you have a magic key that lets you decode Microsoft telemetry, for example? There is an entire profession of network forensics and security analysis to make these determinations. A great deal of commercial products are available to assist and to some degree automate. It is not a 'solved problem', but it is as solved as anything else in security.
- Spooky23 10y agoWe have computers that do things. Google Fireeye.
- __jal 10y agoCan you describe what is "knee jerk" about HTTPS everywhere? It sounds like you're saying that you believe HTTPS is a bad solution to (presumably) the problem of surveillance-friendly plaintext comms via browser. But I'd like to understand. You also seem to be claiming that AV products are somehow a special category of security product, for which evaluation is especially difficult. I don't see it, and in fact, there's a handy chart in that post to help. Companies that have audit requirements for these things are most likely going to need purpose-built tools for this; depending on AV crapware is a terrible idea. And as for the notion that "most" enterprises should be shoulder-surfing their employees, well. I assume you also recommend all employees pass through a metal detector and have all thumb-drives and whatnot inspected on the way out? If not, why not?
- 3pt14159 10y agoShould elementary aged school children have privacy while surfing the internet from school? If the answer to that question is "no" then the answer about HTTPS everywhere can be seen as knee-jerk. Of course, system administrators could put further work into making sure that computers are not used maliciously, for example, by recording the screen constantly and by randomly inspecting the recording or by using machine learning to identify things like pornography, but it won't cover everything (browser bars that are actually malware or other viruses) and it's a whole lot easier to just thwart HTTPS than it is to do anything else.
- euyyn 10y agoSpeculating here: Assuming that you only let prod servers access customer data, you can restrict to which hosts the storage servers open connections to. No?
- cesarb 10y ago> The browser and OS vendors don't provide high quality APIs for this purpose Which APIs should be provided by operating systems and/or browsers? On Windows, browsers (at least Firefox) do provide an API for antivirus scanners, as can be seen by the pause after every download on slower machines with an antivirus scanner (which, the last time I saw it, explicitly mentioned "scanning for viruses" on the download status). On Linux, the operating system kernel provides the fanotify API, which was designed to allow an antivirus scanner to scan every newly created file. What other APIs do you believe should be added?
- Spooky23 10y agoI think there should be an API that allows applications to use a managed service to read browser network IO without relying on a proxy. Think ICAP for Chrome. That way you can leave the network path intact, not worry about proxy bypass, and keep crypto operations in the browser.