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You should reread my post in the context of the post I'm replying to. It's not a recommendation, it's an explanation of where the poster's "how can we trust the
by Godel_unicode 10y ago
You should reread my post in the context of the post I'm replying to. It's not a recommendation, it's an explanation of where the poster's "how can we trust their manufacturing process" question leads. People tend to throw out those types of questions as reasons to not use e.g. Yubikey without thinking through how they would want such proof given to them. People also reverse x86 binaries for profit, but suggesting that RandomSaaS do so to their compiler to check for backdoors would be equally a waste of their time and money.
Just because something is technically possible doesn't mean the average company should do it. Security is about trade-offs.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago" It's not a recommendation, it's an explanation of where the poster's "how can we trust their manufacturing process" question leads. " If it's that, then it was a decent attempt at explaining how big the problem is if one wants to trust every step. Good news is you don't have to as I illustrated. Just a small number of third parties doing a tear down. They can even be enemies reviewing same thing with equipment made in opposing countries for best effect. Old trick of mine. :)