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How would that probabilistic model be applied to consciousness? Genuinely curious here. As far as I can tell, the definition of consciousness that Chalmers and

How would that probabilistic model be applied to consciousness? Genuinely curious here. As far as I can tell, the definition of consciousness that Chalmers and others use doesn't seem to have measurable aspects.

justifier 10y ago
Look to the problems and limitations of nueral networks Local minima'maxima and the unyeildy nature of large numbers of nuerons are both currently being dealt with utilising probabilistic methods the mind functions on electrical signals and should be able to be understood through modeling This is the case regardless of where you stand on dualism
- youdontknowtho 10y ago
  Thanks, that is a really good point.
Koshkin 10y ago
Well, Chalmers is a philosopher, and what philosophy does is it clarifies problems (which often creates more problems to clarify) rather than solves them... Whatever the exact definition, consciousness is a function of a living brain, a function required for the survival of an individual as a part of a group, and since the environment in which an individual operates is characterized by the high degree of uncerainty as to both its present state and especially its future, making decisions must involve probabilistic methods, and so must learning (because we all learn from our mistakes). The process of learning has a physical manifestation due to changes in the brain, which could be "measured," and if we assume the primacy of matter over function, we have to expect that the material substrate also must behave probabilistically. Which probability model is the best one in describing that behavior, remains an open question.
- youdontknowtho 10y ago
  So, I agree with you completely that consciousness is a function of a living brain, where "living brain" is the physical substrate. I don't know if it follows that consciousness has to be probabilistic. The reason that I brought up Chalmers is that he, and others, will say that physical states don't map to subjective consciousness or qualia. Don't get me wrong, I'm much more of a "physicalist" in this regard. I'm not trained and I don't work in the field, but I can't help but think that humans overestimate the complexity and capabilities of consciousness. I think that there is a brain and, like you say, there is some function of it that results in consciousness. I think that we end up with a problem of definitions because the thing that Chalmers et al are describing, I think, doesn't exist. BUT if we are talking about the thing that Chalmers an co are talking about, then no...I don't see a way that you get to qualia and consciousness from protein. I'm kind of rambling. Sorry, it this isn't very coherent.
  - Koshkin 10y ago
    The problem is (not) realizing that our consciousness is as much a function of our brain as it is generated by our interaction with other human beings. I agree with your point about the overestimating. Indeed, social behavior by necessity is rather simple, and, therefore, so is our consciousness. Complicated systems are unreliable, which is why we try to keep things simple - things that we can personally control anyway. And so when things, in their natural progression, get complicated - which they inevitably do, - we give up and submit ourselves to an even simpler, purely social, form of consciousness (by asking for advice, participating in all kinds of social gatherings, etc.), where "qualia" all but disappear. From this perspective it is indeed unrealistic to try to explain human consciousness only as a function of the brain of a particular isolated person.

justifier 10y ago

Look to the problems and limitations of nueral networks Local minima'maxima and the unyeildy nature of large numbers of nuerons are both currently being dealt with utilising probabilistic methods the mind functions on electrical signals and should be able to be understood through modeling This is the case regardless of where you stand on dualism

youdontknowtho 10y ago
Thanks, that is a really good point.

Koshkin 10y ago

Well, Chalmers is a philosopher, and what philosophy does is it clarifies problems (which often creates more problems to clarify) rather than solves them... Whatever the exact definition, consciousness is a function of a living brain, a function required for the survival of an individual as a part of a group, and since the environment in which an individual operates is characterized by the high degree of uncerainty as to both its present state and especially its future, making decisions must involve probabilistic methods, and so must learning (because we all learn from our mistakes). The process of learning has a physical manifestation due to changes in the brain, which could be "measured," and if we assume the primacy of matter over function, we have to expect that the material substrate also must behave probabilistically. Which probability model is the best one in describing that behavior, remains an open question.

youdontknowtho 10y ago
So, I agree with you completely that consciousness is a function of a living brain, where "living brain" is the physical substrate. I don't know if it follows that consciousness has to be probabilistic. The reason that I brought up Chalmers is that he, and others, will say that physical states don't map to subjective consciousness or qualia. Don't get me wrong, I'm much more of a "physicalist" in this regard. I'm not trained and I don't work in the field, but I can't help but think that humans overestimate the complexity and capabilities of consciousness. I think that there is a brain and, like you say, there is some function of it that results in consciousness. I think that we end up with a problem of definitions because the thing that Chalmers et al are describing, I think, doesn't exist. BUT if we are talking about the thing that Chalmers an co are talking about, then no...I don't see a way that you get to qualia and consciousness from protein. I'm kind of rambling. Sorry, it this isn't very coherent.
- Koshkin 10y ago
  The problem is (not) realizing that our consciousness is as much a function of our brain as it is generated by our interaction with other human beings. I agree with your point about the overestimating. Indeed, social behavior by necessity is rather simple, and, therefore, so is our consciousness. Complicated systems are unreliable, which is why we try to keep things simple - things that we can personally control anyway. And so when things, in their natural progression, get complicated - which they inevitably do, - we give up and submit ourselves to an even simpler, purely social, form of consciousness (by asking for advice, participating in all kinds of social gatherings, etc.), where "qualia" all but disappear. From this perspective it is indeed unrealistic to try to explain human consciousness only as a function of the brain of a particular isolated person.