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I hope to clear this up. If I understood him correctly, he's saying that I was claiming that if we agreed on facts (if facts were settled, as it were), we woul

I hope to clear this up. If I understood him correctly, he's saying that I was claiming that if we agreed on facts (if facts were settled, as it were), we would agree in opinions, which is clearly false as a matter of fact. My claim is that we should agree in opinions, if facts were settled. I think difference between would/should is significant here. I am saying: if facts were settled, and we had a disagreement, at least one of the parties in the disagreement should not hold their opinions (would be wrong). I am not saying: if facts were settled, we could not be in disagreement. If it was possible in principle to settle the facts, our apparent entitlement to hold certain opinions would be, in a sense, illusory. We can act on the assumption that it is not, for sure, but that doesn't make our entitlement right. I am not even claiming that facts are settled (that is, that we know what is true as a matter of fact). Since they are not settled, we should be more cautious in our taking of opinions, and of course that goes both ways.

mistermann 10y ago
It's a largely philosophical question so not surprising that it's difficult to go about. At least for me, I am coming from the angle that some things are a matter of fact, and some are a matter of opinion. For example, everyone can be fully informed on economics, but on the matter of "how much should a waiter be paid in New York City", there is no "right" answer. That might very well be not what the disagreement was about from your perspective though. :/
- fmoralesc 10y ago
  Yes, I understand that. The issue is that not all disagreements are about what you call "matters of opinion" (and thus faultless [1]). (And even when they are, one can give an approximate answer that filters out a bunch of alternative opinions on the matter: for example, it seems like a waiter in NYC should not be paid less than a certain a amount, let's say, the average it takes for someone in NYC in the person's social strata to pay rent and be able to eat and go to work each day). The issue really comes up when one takes all disagreements to take this form, which is, I think, what this thread was initially about (then the GGP asked why we should care about the facts at all). [1]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405
  - mistermann 10y ago
    Ah, I wasn't aware there was some formal theories on this idea! Along the same lines (maybe), I've always thought an improved way to approach disagreement (breaking down "matters of opinion) is to break things down into components to better discover discrete points of contention. When you have a unsolvable dispute, you've either reached a matter of opinion, or, the disputed topic has to be broken down further. I wonder if that's the approach the book takes? I think this approach could be quite successful, assuming two reasonable people involved (a tall order nowadays perhaps).

mistermann 10y ago

It's a largely philosophical question so not surprising that it's difficult to go about. At least for me, I am coming from the angle that some things are a matter of fact, and some are a matter of opinion. For example, everyone can be fully informed on economics, but on the matter of "how much should a waiter be paid in New York City", there is no "right" answer. That might very well be not what the disagreement was about from your perspective though. :/

fmoralesc 10y ago
Yes, I understand that. The issue is that not all disagreements are about what you call "matters of opinion" (and thus faultless [1]). (And even when they are, one can give an approximate answer that filters out a bunch of alternative opinions on the matter: for example, it seems like a waiter in NYC should not be paid less than a certain a amount, let's say, the average it takes for someone in NYC in the person's social strata to pay rent and be able to eat and go to work each day). The issue really comes up when one takes all disagreements to take this form, which is, I think, what this thread was initially about (then the GGP asked why we should care about the facts at all). [1]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405
- mistermann 10y ago
  Ah, I wasn't aware there was some formal theories on this idea! Along the same lines (maybe), I've always thought an improved way to approach disagreement (breaking down "matters of opinion) is to break things down into components to better discover discrete points of contention. When you have a unsolvable dispute, you've either reached a matter of opinion, or, the disputed topic has to be broken down further. I wonder if that's the approach the book takes? I think this approach could be quite successful, assuming two reasonable people involved (a tall order nowadays perhaps).