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No, that is not what I'm claiming. I'm arguing for a normative claim: when people agree on the facts, they should not disagree on opinion. It is obvious that as

No, that is not what I'm claiming. I'm arguing for a normative claim: when people agree on the facts, they should not disagree on opinion. It is obvious that as a matter of fact, they can disagree / but this 'can' is that of a matter of fact possibility, not one of 'absolute allowance'. People can come to believe their opinions are correct, but that doesn't make them so. We can, as a matter of fact, live with the fact that our opinions are not absolutely allowed, but I don't think that makes our holding those opinions right in a strict sense.

mistermann 10y ago
> No, that is not what I'm claiming. I'm arguing for a normative claim: when people agree on the facts, they should not disagree on opinion. I'm confused, isn't that exactly what the parent's argument is though? You said that's not what you're saying, and then repeat the exact same thing, contradicting yourself. Personally I disagree with you, if I'm understanding correctly. To me, a huge chunk of the population, you included it would seem, believes that some things are no longer a matter of opinion, that 10 and 20 years ago everyone would have happily agreed are matters of opinion rather than matters of fact.
- fmoralesc 10y ago
  I hope to clear this up. If I understood him correctly, he's saying that I was claiming that if we agreed on facts (if facts were settled, as it were), we would agree in opinions, which is clearly false as a matter of fact. My claim is that we should agree in opinions, if facts were settled. I think difference between would/should is significant here. I am saying: if facts were settled, and we had a disagreement, at least one of the parties in the disagreement should not hold their opinions (would be wrong). I am not saying: if facts were settled, we could not be in disagreement. If it was possible in principle to settle the facts, our apparent entitlement to hold certain opinions would be, in a sense, illusory. We can act on the assumption that it is not, for sure, but that doesn't make our entitlement right. I am not even claiming that facts are settled (that is, that we know what is true as a matter of fact). Since they are not settled, we should be more cautious in our taking of opinions, and of course that goes both ways.
  - mistermann 10y ago
    It's a largely philosophical question so not surprising that it's difficult to go about. At least for me, I am coming from the angle that some things are a matter of fact, and some are a matter of opinion. For example, everyone can be fully informed on economics, but on the matter of "how much should a waiter be paid in New York City", there is no "right" answer. That might very well be not what the disagreement was about from your perspective though. :/
    - fmoralesc 10y ago
      Yes, I understand that. The issue is that not all disagreements are about what you call "matters of opinion" (and thus faultless [1]). (And even when they are, one can give an approximate answer that filters out a bunch of alternative opinions on the matter: for example, it seems like a waiter in NYC should not be paid less than a certain a amount, let's say, the average it takes for someone in NYC in the person's social strata to pay rent and be able to eat and go to work each day). The issue really comes up when one takes all disagreements to take this form, which is, I think, what this thread was initially about (then the GGP asked why we should care about the facts at all). [1]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405
      - mistermann 10y ago
        Ah, I wasn't aware there was some formal theories on this idea! Along the same lines (maybe), I've always thought an improved way to approach disagreement (breaking down "matters of opinion) is to break things down into components to better discover discrete points of contention. When you have a unsolvable dispute, you've either reached a matter of opinion, or, the disputed topic has to be broken down further. I wonder if that's the approach the book takes? I think this approach could be quite successful, assuming two reasonable people involved (a tall order nowadays perhaps).

mistermann 10y ago

> No, that is not what I'm claiming. I'm arguing for a normative claim: when people agree on the facts, they should not disagree on opinion. I'm confused, isn't that exactly what the parent's argument is though? You said that's not what you're saying, and then repeat the exact same thing, contradicting yourself. Personally I disagree with you, if I'm understanding correctly. To me, a huge chunk of the population, you included it would seem, believes that some things are no longer a matter of opinion, that 10 and 20 years ago everyone would have happily agreed are matters of opinion rather than matters of fact.

fmoralesc 10y ago
I hope to clear this up. If I understood him correctly, he's saying that I was claiming that if we agreed on facts (if facts were settled, as it were), we would agree in opinions, which is clearly false as a matter of fact. My claim is that we should agree in opinions, if facts were settled. I think difference between would/should is significant here. I am saying: if facts were settled, and we had a disagreement, at least one of the parties in the disagreement should not hold their opinions (would be wrong). I am not saying: if facts were settled, we could not be in disagreement. If it was possible in principle to settle the facts, our apparent entitlement to hold certain opinions would be, in a sense, illusory. We can act on the assumption that it is not, for sure, but that doesn't make our entitlement right. I am not even claiming that facts are settled (that is, that we know what is true as a matter of fact). Since they are not settled, we should be more cautious in our taking of opinions, and of course that goes both ways.
- mistermann 10y ago
  It's a largely philosophical question so not surprising that it's difficult to go about. At least for me, I am coming from the angle that some things are a matter of fact, and some are a matter of opinion. For example, everyone can be fully informed on economics, but on the matter of "how much should a waiter be paid in New York City", there is no "right" answer. That might very well be not what the disagreement was about from your perspective though. :/
  - fmoralesc 10y ago
    Yes, I understand that. The issue is that not all disagreements are about what you call "matters of opinion" (and thus faultless [1]). (And even when they are, one can give an approximate answer that filters out a bunch of alternative opinions on the matter: for example, it seems like a waiter in NYC should not be paid less than a certain a amount, let's say, the average it takes for someone in NYC in the person's social strata to pay rent and be able to eat and go to work each day). The issue really comes up when one takes all disagreements to take this form, which is, I think, what this thread was initially about (then the GGP asked why we should care about the facts at all). [1]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545405
    - mistermann 10y ago
      Ah, I wasn't aware there was some formal theories on this idea! Along the same lines (maybe), I've always thought an improved way to approach disagreement (breaking down "matters of opinion) is to break things down into components to better discover discrete points of contention. When you have a unsolvable dispute, you've either reached a matter of opinion, or, the disputed topic has to be broken down further. I wonder if that's the approach the book takes? I think this approach could be quite successful, assuming two reasonable people involved (a tall order nowadays perhaps).