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>"* An enormous installed base of clients that won't do encryption, meaning that at best you're attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted tra
by bogomipz 10y ago
>"* An enormous installed base of clients that won't do encryption, meaning that at best you're attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted transport."
These reasons seems to suggest that encrypted email is "all or nothing" and I'm not sure why that is. I am not interested in using encrypted email with all of my conversations. For non personal emails I am perfectly OK with sending email in clear test. For people who I communicate with only via encrypted email, I simply add them to my "encrypted email" contact list any my email client encrypts those emails. The reverse of this would be true on this recipients end. So the idea that its all or nothing is no different than HTTP traffic, example - I don't care if some trivial blog about cats isn't HTTPs.
> * A protocol that leaks metadata, including some message content, at the envelope layer.
This is true of some IPSEC modes as well example Tunnel Mode vs Transport Mode. If I am OK with just payload being encrypted then so what? Again why does this have to be all or nothing with regard to email?
>"Hundreds of millions of users that primarily access messages through browser clients that can't meaningfully implement crypto."
And encrypted email in this context would simply be "unavailable." This is not that much different from down-level versions of browsers or Java not being able to use newer versions of TLS.
>"* An unencrypted installed base that ensures encryption will be opt-in for the foreseeable future, meaning that users will routinely reveal plaintext accidentally by, for instance, quoting messages and forgetting to encrypt"
What is wrong with opt-in? Again why is it all or nothing? I either choose to add someone as an encrypted contact or not. People already leak all of kinds of information via forwarding email. Why is this an issue? I can also take a screen shot of an iMessage that was sent to me encrypted on my phone and paste it to someone else.
>"End user demands for things like search that can only be delivered efficiently at scale by databases of plaintext (most likely at centralized servers)"
Clients can maintain a local copy of an encrypted index. I don't think this is a non-starter.
- Kalium 10y agoYou're absolutely right! If you're willing to be disciplined and communicate solely with similarly disciplined people, encrypted email can be very secure. The basic problem with email is that the protocol does not adapt well to encrypted content. Too much usable data is in the envelope. On top of this, there are decades of UX expectations and conventions that become unsafe in encrypted contexts. As a result, most users will be highly unsafe by default, and any given person is likely to be significantly less safe than they believe. But again, you're completely right! It's very possible to use it in a smaller group of people who understand and accept all the tradeoffs. It's just marginally less than ideal for mass adoption, which is where much of the thought is going.