4 ms·

Um, what about the Elaboration Likelihood Model? It's about persuasion and it contends that there are two ways it happens: through a rational evaluation of the

by theoh 10y ago

Um, what about the Elaboration Likelihood Model? It's about persuasion and it contends that there are two ways it happens: through a rational evaluation of the material, or based on the credibility of the source (and other social cues). Now, sometimes you might come to believe something through repetition, but it's possible to verify things (some of the time) and you shouldn't just claim that repetition is the only route.

gizmo 10y ago
I think the model is wrong, because it presumes people are rational agents that change their mind either through careful evaluation of the arguments or by outsourcing this rational evaluation to a trustworthy person. This model doesn't take repetition at all into consideration, so I don't think it holds up empirically. Back in Aristotle's day it was about Ethos, Pathos, and Logos. I don't think that model has stood the test of time either. I don't want to open Pandora's Box, but look at Trump's speeches. He persuades through repetition, and it demonstrably works.
- theoh 10y ago
  Ok, I didn't mean to beg the question by simply claiming that people can rationally evaluate statements. The things people learn are not noise. They have structure, they have hidden consistencies. Whatever you think of the rationality or otherwise of thought, surely you will agree that trying to learn inconsistent facts is going to be more trouble than learning consistent facts which support each other in a cumulative way. People might identify with the opinions of a politician because they already hold those opinions, or similar opinions. They are unlikely to ever agree with/be persuaded by complete inconsistent nonsense, however often it is repeated. Like, I mean nonsense that doesn't even have linguistic structure or maybe any meaning.
  - gizmo 10y ago
    I guess we look at the world very differently, because: > They are unlikely to ever agree with/be persuaded by complete inconsistent nonsense, however often it is repeated. Like, I mean nonsense that doesn't even have linguistic structure or maybe any meaning. If the US election hasn't persuaded you that complete gibberish can be persuasive when repeated endlessly, there's nothing I can say that will.
    - smallnamespace 10y ago
      It might be gibberish at a factual or logical level, but at least for a certain portion of the populace, it hits all the right emotional notes and checks all the right boxes in their value and belief systems. Of course, you won't see it yourself if you don't share their worldview and are unable to empathize and put yourself in their shoes.
      - gizmo 10y ago
        I think that's right, but in part because it's all gibberish people with wildly different values can hear him speak and still and hear what they want to hear.
      - deleted 10y ago
        [deleted]
    - theoh 10y ago
      I'm aware of the theory of the "big lie", and the fact that neurons that fire together, wire together... But what about Feynman's injunction: "The first principle is that you must not fool yourself -- and you are the easiest person to fool." Is that kind of empirical principle just out of reach for the standard human? In terms of repetition, I think David Hume's theory of causal inference is pretty relevant too. Just because something is repeated regularly, e.g. seems to happen every day doesn't mean that on the day when it doesn't happen, our heads explode because we have built a rigid expectation. Instead we can usually discern possible, exceptional, reasons why it isn't happening. I'm totally in agreement with you on the role of repetition in eroding the landscape of memory to create convictions. We might rarely remember a one off event that is never referred to. But you seem to be claiming that there's no higher-level activity, or even possibility of higher-level activity involved in mentally evaluating what to believe. The famous Star Trek scene where Picard is encouraged/"brainwashed" to lie about the number of lights he sees comes to mind. He resists and continues to report what his senses tell him. This cultural theme of reason resisting the repetition of lies is a big one, and you haven't really presented any convincing evidence to discredit it.
      - 10y ago
  - rdtsc 10y ago
    > People might identify with the opinions of a politician because they already hold those opinions, Agree and I think it is even more than that. It is about how genuine they seem. I've listen to Hillary, Trump, Sanders and Obama, and some just naturally sound more genuine. Obama seemed genuine, like he believed what he was saying, Trump and Sanders as well. But not Hillary. She said all the right things, she was very polite, and seemed to be personable with jokes and remarks sprinkled here and there. But overall she sounded fake and scripted. I posit, hearing someone who seems to truly believe what they say is a solid first step in persuading others to change their opinions. Otherwise it becomes an uphill battle and it is just pandering to people who already believe and agree with the argument.

by theoh 10y ago

gizmo 10y ago

I think the model is wrong, because it presumes people are rational agents that change their mind either through careful evaluation of the arguments or by outsourcing this rational evaluation to a trustworthy person. This model doesn't take repetition at all into consideration, so I don't think it holds up empirically. Back in Aristotle's day it was about Ethos, Pathos, and Logos. I don't think that model has stood the test of time either. I don't want to open Pandora's Box, but look at Trump's speeches. He persuades through repetition, and it demonstrably works.

theoh 10y ago
Ok, I didn't mean to beg the question by simply claiming that people can rationally evaluate statements. The things people learn are not noise. They have structure, they have hidden consistencies. Whatever you think of the rationality or otherwise of thought, surely you will agree that trying to learn inconsistent facts is going to be more trouble than learning consistent facts which support each other in a cumulative way. People might identify with the opinions of a politician because they already hold those opinions, or similar opinions. They are unlikely to ever agree with/be persuaded by complete inconsistent nonsense, however often it is repeated. Like, I mean nonsense that doesn't even have linguistic structure or maybe any meaning.
- gizmo 10y ago
  I guess we look at the world very differently, because: > They are unlikely to ever agree with/be persuaded by complete inconsistent nonsense, however often it is repeated. Like, I mean nonsense that doesn't even have linguistic structure or maybe any meaning. If the US election hasn't persuaded you that complete gibberish can be persuasive when repeated endlessly, there's nothing I can say that will.
  - smallnamespace 10y ago
    It might be gibberish at a factual or logical level, but at least for a certain portion of the populace, it hits all the right emotional notes and checks all the right boxes in their value and belief systems. Of course, you won't see it yourself if you don't share their worldview and are unable to empathize and put yourself in their shoes.
    - gizmo 10y ago
      I think that's right, but in part because it's all gibberish people with wildly different values can hear him speak and still and hear what they want to hear.
    - deleted 10y ago
      [deleted]
  - theoh 10y ago
    I'm aware of the theory of the "big lie", and the fact that neurons that fire together, wire together... But what about Feynman's injunction: "The first principle is that you must not fool yourself -- and you are the easiest person to fool." Is that kind of empirical principle just out of reach for the standard human? In terms of repetition, I think David Hume's theory of causal inference is pretty relevant too. Just because something is repeated regularly, e.g. seems to happen every day doesn't mean that on the day when it doesn't happen, our heads explode because we have built a rigid expectation. Instead we can usually discern possible, exceptional, reasons why it isn't happening. I'm totally in agreement with you on the role of repetition in eroding the landscape of memory to create convictions. We might rarely remember a one off event that is never referred to. But you seem to be claiming that there's no higher-level activity, or even possibility of higher-level activity involved in mentally evaluating what to believe. The famous Star Trek scene where Picard is encouraged/"brainwashed" to lie about the number of lights he sees comes to mind. He resists and continues to report what his senses tell him. This cultural theme of reason resisting the repetition of lies is a big one, and you haven't really presented any convincing evidence to discredit it.
    - 10y ago
- rdtsc 10y ago
  > People might identify with the opinions of a politician because they already hold those opinions, Agree and I think it is even more than that. It is about how genuine they seem. I've listen to Hillary, Trump, Sanders and Obama, and some just naturally sound more genuine. Obama seemed genuine, like he believed what he was saying, Trump and Sanders as well. But not Hillary. She said all the right things, she was very polite, and seemed to be personable with jokes and remarks sprinkled here and there. But overall she sounded fake and scripted. I posit, hearing someone who seems to truly believe what they say is a solid first step in persuading others to change their opinions. Otherwise it becomes an uphill battle and it is just pandering to people who already believe and agree with the argument.