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Even the famous Podesta e-mail hack was made possible thanks to the... Google AMP page server policies! See the picture(1) here: https://motherboard-images.vi
by acqq 10y ago
Even the famous Podesta e-mail hack was made possible thanks to the... Google AMP page server policies!
See the picture(1) here:
https://motherboard-images.vice.com/content-images/contentimage/38680/1476913065736588.png https://motherboard-images.vice.com/content-images/contentim...
Unless you knew that google.com made their main domain redirect to anything(!) to provide amp, you'd really believe that the click was going to end up on the google.com servers, the place where your login data for Google services really is. Instead, google.com was used as the least expected redirector of them all.
It was known among the security people:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Apr/70 http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Apr/70
But google at that time kept it being a fully invisible redirector. Their explanation then: they "do not consider open redirects to be a security issue." They also wrote: "we generally hold that a small number of properly monitored redirectors offers fairly clear benefits and poses very little practical risk." Benefits for whom but Google? And what was proper then in this Podesta redirect?
It seems they now finally changed the handling of the redirection, adding "The previous page is sending you to ..." instead of doing it invisibly. It took the Podesta e-mail hack, possibly changing who's gotten to be a US president, and some time to go by for them to add that change.
That's the untold story of who, how, and for which goals influenced the election (Google, Amp, as the unexpected effect of the profit goals of spreading amp as much as possible).
Apparently the aide of Podesta later claimed to have made a typo: "When the phishing email first arrived, Podesta referred it to a number of aides. An aide named Charles Delavan replied, “This is a legitimate email"" "Delavan says he had meant to write “illegitimate email,” and simply mistyped." Or maybe it really looked legitimate to him at that moment: the server behind the link was obviously google.com. Who didn't carefully follow what Google did with amp couldn't possibly guess that the main google.com domain just became an invisible redirector thanks to amp.
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1) The picture is from the following article:
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-hackers-broke-into-john-podesta-and-colin-powells-gmail-accounts https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-hackers-broke...
- xigency 10y agoWhat's also amazing is that this specific Google vulnerability was disclosed to Google and discussed on this website before that leak.
- acqq 10y agoI know that as I saw the link and "parsed it" in my head I've concluded "but it obviously goes to google.com", the real place where also I log myself in. Later, I couldn't have believed my eyes as I've typed such an address in the browser and ended elsewhere, wherever, I had to use curl to convince me that, yes, google.com/amp just invisibly redirected to the site and the page of the rest of the url, whatever the rest was.