4 ms·

when there's every incentive to take all you can before everyone else does, this is bound to happen. as someone has already said, this is a repeat of the trage

when there's every incentive to take all you can before everyone else does, this is bound to happen. as someone has already said, this is a repeat of the tragedy of the commons we need a system of property rights for the seas, rights to fish at certain places and times, that create incentives to not overfish and to protect this valuable resource. If you own the rights to a stream of income, you don't have the incentive to gut it and sell whatever you can sell now before everyone else. Agriculture is impossible without property rights also. Why would you plant and take care of plants if anyone can just take what they want?

anigbrowl 16y ago
I see your point, but the difference is that land is fixed and generally easier to enforce authority over. International waters are outside normal jurisdictions by definition, so how do you grant and enforce property rights in non-coastal fisheries? Say you want to divide up Atlantic fisheries for this purpose, trying to balance the demands of 40 or 50 countries that operate fishing fleets is going to be a nightmare. If you go just by coastal size, where do you draw the line over which countries are allowed to participate? Developed countries with better fishing and food distribution industries, like Canada or the EU, are going to claim larger chunks based on the size of their existing economy, whereas poor countries on the west coast of Africa that don't have blue-water fleets are naturally going to object that they're being cut off from future access to resources.
- moultano 16y ago
  That's the great thing about marine sanctuaries. You agree upon a region in the middle of the ocean to declare off-limits for fishing. The fish population of those regions repopulates the rest of the ocean, and you have the best of both words. Unrestrained fishing, and stable fish stocks. You can even find perpetrators using satellites, which helps with enforcement. The hard part is agreeing upon regions both large enough and spanning enough biomes.
  - hga 16y ago
    I think the really hard part is enforcement. E.g. see the Cod Wars (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cod_Wars http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cod_Wars) which were between two relatively developed and sophisticated European countries. It could get much messier, e.g. imagine the USNavy trying to enforce restrictions in the open seas on trawlers from the PRC. I'm not sure how useful satellites would be at finding perpetrators for the purposes of enforcement, at least not without sending a ship to confirm details.
    - j_baker 16y ago
      "As a result, a fleet of Royal Naval warships and tug-boats were employed to act as a deterrent against any future harassment of British fishing crews by the Icelandic craft. The conflict involved several cases of vessels ramming each other." Was that all it took to have a conflict classified as a war back then?
      - hga 16y ago
        It was a conflict that was prosecuted by force instead of at negotiation tables, I think that'll suffice for the word "War". There was certainly a lot of treasure expended, if not blood.
      - jacquesm 16y ago
        It was a definite case of Great Britain stepping way over its bounds as a nation and bullying a much smaller nation with a navy of much smaller proportions over a resource the British themselves had destroyed around their home Island. Very bad episode, and really reflecting bad on the security council as well, which should have stepped in. Of course th e British had considerable clout politically as well. If it hadn't been for that NATO base who knows what would have happened.
- stretchwithme 16y ago
  Sell all rights to the highest bidder and then distribute the funds to each country according to population. The ultimate guardian of any property right is the owner. Just as government is unable to keep squatters out of foreclosed properties, so to it is impossible to keep looters out of the seas with active interested owners. I'm convinced that owners will come up with all sorts of ways to enforce their rights. It will be their money on the line, after all. And if the penalties for poaching are high enough, the incentives are going to be in favor of owners. The practical effect of this is fish will cost more than just the cost of picking it up out of the ocean. And that's exactly what needs to happen. The price needs to reflect the relative scarcity of these resources in order for people to change their habits. Property rights can accomplish what we need. Collective ownership has failed and its time to act accordingly.

anigbrowl 16y ago

I see your point, but the difference is that land is fixed and generally easier to enforce authority over. International waters are outside normal jurisdictions by definition, so how do you grant and enforce property rights in non-coastal fisheries? Say you want to divide up Atlantic fisheries for this purpose, trying to balance the demands of 40 or 50 countries that operate fishing fleets is going to be a nightmare. If you go just by coastal size, where do you draw the line over which countries are allowed to participate? Developed countries with better fishing and food distribution industries, like Canada or the EU, are going to claim larger chunks based on the size of their existing economy, whereas poor countries on the west coast of Africa that don't have blue-water fleets are naturally going to object that they're being cut off from future access to resources.

moultano 16y ago
That's the great thing about marine sanctuaries. You agree upon a region in the middle of the ocean to declare off-limits for fishing. The fish population of those regions repopulates the rest of the ocean, and you have the best of both words. Unrestrained fishing, and stable fish stocks. You can even find perpetrators using satellites, which helps with enforcement. The hard part is agreeing upon regions both large enough and spanning enough biomes.
- hga 16y ago
  I think the really hard part is enforcement. E.g. see the Cod Wars (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cod_Wars http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cod_Wars) which were between two relatively developed and sophisticated European countries. It could get much messier, e.g. imagine the USNavy trying to enforce restrictions in the open seas on trawlers from the PRC. I'm not sure how useful satellites would be at finding perpetrators for the purposes of enforcement, at least not without sending a ship to confirm details.
  - j_baker 16y ago
    "As a result, a fleet of Royal Naval warships and tug-boats were employed to act as a deterrent against any future harassment of British fishing crews by the Icelandic craft. The conflict involved several cases of vessels ramming each other." Was that all it took to have a conflict classified as a war back then?
    - hga 16y ago
      It was a conflict that was prosecuted by force instead of at negotiation tables, I think that'll suffice for the word "War". There was certainly a lot of treasure expended, if not blood.
    - jacquesm 16y ago
      It was a definite case of Great Britain stepping way over its bounds as a nation and bullying a much smaller nation with a navy of much smaller proportions over a resource the British themselves had destroyed around their home Island. Very bad episode, and really reflecting bad on the security council as well, which should have stepped in. Of course th e British had considerable clout politically as well. If it hadn't been for that NATO base who knows what would have happened.
stretchwithme 16y ago
Sell all rights to the highest bidder and then distribute the funds to each country according to population. The ultimate guardian of any property right is the owner. Just as government is unable to keep squatters out of foreclosed properties, so to it is impossible to keep looters out of the seas with active interested owners. I'm convinced that owners will come up with all sorts of ways to enforce their rights. It will be their money on the line, after all. And if the penalties for poaching are high enough, the incentives are going to be in favor of owners. The practical effect of this is fish will cost more than just the cost of picking it up out of the ocean. And that's exactly what needs to happen. The price needs to reflect the relative scarcity of these resources in order for people to change their habits. Property rights can accomplish what we need. Collective ownership has failed and its time to act accordingly.