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That doesn't really help, though, because now you ask eg: a Cyrillic speaker to use Latin characters in place of their own characters that are different but sim
by NamTaf 10y ago
That doesn't really help, though, because now you ask eg: a Cyrillic speaker to use Latin characters in place of their own characters that are different but simply look the same. That's like us expecting Germans to use B instead of ß (I know it's not a close example, but it's the first that came to mind for me) even though ß translates to a 'ss' sound, which is nothing like a B sound. so 'heißt' goes from 'heisst' to 'heibt'.
Enforcing all of one subset makes more sense to me, though even that's not foolproof because the above example uses both B and ß in the same language. But at least it'll reduce the attack surface, I guess.
- SeanLuke 10y agoI don't see what the problem is. For example, you could do this: create a string->"final string" hash function, where heißt and heibt both hash to the same final string (let's say it's HEIBT). You're only allowed to register final strings. If I create a company called heißt.com, then going to heibt.com (or HeIbT.com, hêìbŤ.com, or whatever) will also go to that same domain. A company can use heißt.com if it likes, or hêìbŤ.com, or whatever it prefers. But a spammer can't create a lookalike string. Why wouldn't this work?