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China needed strong assurances from the US and UK that formally splitting from the Soviet Union wouldn't see the American alliance then turn against China in a

China needed strong assurances from the US and UK that formally splitting from the Soviet Union wouldn't see the American alliance then turn against China in a divide-and-conquer strategy. Could we have gotten a better deal? I'm not sure. Given the earlier incursion into Vietnam and Korea, the military support of the ROC and the militarization of the First Island Chain, I can't imagine that anything short of the very strong reassurance the alliance pursued with the "One China Policy" would have been acceptable. The move is one of the only things heralded of the scandal-plagued Nixon Administration as a wild success for the United States, and is even often credited for being the key diplomatic victory that ultimately won America the Cold War.

skissane 10y ago
Did the US-China alliance win the Cold War? To what extent did it contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union? I think most of the reasons why the Soviet Empire fell were internal factors rather than external pressures, and the US-China alliance made at best a marginal difference to the outcome. Indeed, what did the US and its allies actually get out of their anti-Soviet alliance with PRC? Nixon hoped that it would help the US in Vietnam; but obviously it didn't – South Vietnam lost the war and they probably would have lost it just the same even if Nixon's China trip never happened. More broadly, I honestly can't see any military benefits for the US and its allies from the deal. The various potential military hotspots – Vietnam, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea – would probably be in much the same state if the US-China deal never happened. Obviously some sort of understanding with PRC had to be reached eventually, since pretending ROC was the government of the whole of China wasn't tenable in the long run, but the US could have extracted some major concessions from PRC in exchange for recognition instead of basically conceding to PRC all its major objectives – an alliance against the Soviets was not a huge concession from PRC given that PRC and USSR were already mutually hostile since the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s. Many people say that Nixon's decision was a great strategic move, but I am unconvinced – the US got some short-term assistance against the Soviets which it didn't really need and didn't make much difference anyway; in exchange, the US put itself in a weaker strategic position vis-à-vis China for many decades to come. And of course, China's economic development since the 1980s has provided many economic benefits to the US and its allies. But, that still could have happened even if there was a more assertive US policy towards PRC, such as a "two Chinas policy" of recognising both PRC and ROC and maintaining diplomatic relations with both. Under this model, it would not be essential that PRC itself abandon the "one China" position, merely that it be willing to accept trade and diplomatic relations with countries that adopted the "two Chinas" position instead. If the US had made that the price for US-PRC trade from the outset, I think Beijing probably would have come around to paying it. In the 1970s, the US was a vastly richer country than PRC (the gap is still there but it has closed a lot in the last 30-40 years), and PRC had far more to gain from US trade than vice versa, so the US arguably had more power to set the ground terms for the relationship – but the US despite having the far stronger hand chose not to play it.
- jwtadvice 10y ago
  Thanks for your informed and interesting comment! This is an interesting position, though I think it suffers from the same shortcuts that much US thinking does when it tries to grapple with prior arrangements that seem inconvenient today because of changing strategic context. To what extent did it contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union? An incredible amount. China blocked the Soviet Union in all of South Asia, it abstained from diplomatic support - it wielded both its position on the UNSC and it's nuclear capability to check USSR. Then, it challenged the central tenets of Communism specifying that it had a different interpretation closer to the original theory - thus challenging the centrality of Russia ideologically. China's withdrawl represented approximately a third of the world population removing itself from the union: the concept of "domino theory" at the time described - in a certain pop science way - how states arriving into and dropping out of the union had a chain reaction effect. Since the alliance with China, the Cold War no longer was fought in the Asian theatre - closing down an entire continent of front to the war. The rest of the Cold War would be fought in Central Asia (and eventually in the Middle East), and in Europe. Of course, the United States knew from very early that it was going to lose in Vietnam: the Pentagon Papers discussed this in great detail. The United States was there on a cost imposition exercise. The result it found in the alliance with China was a mutually satisfactory way to close the conflict. In this regard China didn't win the Vietnam war either. > The various potential military hotspots – Vietnam, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea – would probably be in much the same state if the US-China deal never happened. I have no idea. That's 60 years of alternative history to imagine. Fascinating, but not clear. > Many people say that Nixon's decision was a great strategic move, but I am unconvinced – the US got some short-term assistance against the Soviets which it didn't really need and didn't make much difference anyway; in exchange, the US put itself in a weaker strategic position vis-à-vis China for many decades to come. This seems to be a rising opinion in the National Security Core of the United States, and also seems to be the take of the new Trump Administration. Personally I see this as historical revisionism, contextualized by modern concerns over historical accuracy. I fully agree that China and it's potential rise are considered by the National Security State of the American Government to be a dark horse scenario, and a greater potential spoiler to American hegemony than Russia (a waning power) today. I understand how someone could mistake the situation we are in today with a security outlook at China's rise and want to throw out some of the alliance concessions because in this day and age they are inconvenient. We've seen that before in history (indeed, in American history) and so it's congruent with the kind of behavior we would expect. > China's economic development since the 1980s has provided many economic benefits to the US and its allies. But, that still could have happened even if there was a more assertive US policy towards PRC I think all of this is very accurate, provided there was _some_ deal to get an alliance. Had it been possible for the United States to do that without recognizing PRC, I serious doubt. But yeah, if that had been possible, I think much of the geoeconomic situation would have looked the same.

skissane 10y ago

Did the US-China alliance win the Cold War? To what extent did it contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union? I think most of the reasons why the Soviet Empire fell were internal factors rather than external pressures, and the US-China alliance made at best a marginal difference to the outcome. Indeed, what did the US and its allies actually get out of their anti-Soviet alliance with PRC? Nixon hoped that it would help the US in Vietnam; but obviously it didn't – South Vietnam lost the war and they probably would have lost it just the same even if Nixon's China trip never happened. More broadly, I honestly can't see any military benefits for the US and its allies from the deal. The various potential military hotspots – Vietnam, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea – would probably be in much the same state if the US-China deal never happened. Obviously some sort of understanding with PRC had to be reached eventually, since pretending ROC was the government of the whole of China wasn't tenable in the long run, but the US could have extracted some major concessions from PRC in exchange for recognition instead of basically conceding to PRC all its major objectives – an alliance against the Soviets was not a huge concession from PRC given that PRC and USSR were already mutually hostile since the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s. Many people say that Nixon's decision was a great strategic move, but I am unconvinced – the US got some short-term assistance against the Soviets which it didn't really need and didn't make much difference anyway; in exchange, the US put itself in a weaker strategic position vis-à-vis China for many decades to come. And of course, China's economic development since the 1980s has provided many economic benefits to the US and its allies. But, that still could have happened even if there was a more assertive US policy towards PRC, such as a "two Chinas policy" of recognising both PRC and ROC and maintaining diplomatic relations with both. Under this model, it would not be essential that PRC itself abandon the "one China" position, merely that it be willing to accept trade and diplomatic relations with countries that adopted the "two Chinas" position instead. If the US had made that the price for US-PRC trade from the outset, I think Beijing probably would have come around to paying it. In the 1970s, the US was a vastly richer country than PRC (the gap is still there but it has closed a lot in the last 30-40 years), and PRC had far more to gain from US trade than vice versa, so the US arguably had more power to set the ground terms for the relationship – but the US despite having the far stronger hand chose not to play it.

jwtadvice 10y ago
Thanks for your informed and interesting comment! This is an interesting position, though I think it suffers from the same shortcuts that much US thinking does when it tries to grapple with prior arrangements that seem inconvenient today because of changing strategic context. To what extent did it contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union? An incredible amount. China blocked the Soviet Union in all of South Asia, it abstained from diplomatic support - it wielded both its position on the UNSC and it's nuclear capability to check USSR. Then, it challenged the central tenets of Communism specifying that it had a different interpretation closer to the original theory - thus challenging the centrality of Russia ideologically. China's withdrawl represented approximately a third of the world population removing itself from the union: the concept of "domino theory" at the time described - in a certain pop science way - how states arriving into and dropping out of the union had a chain reaction effect. Since the alliance with China, the Cold War no longer was fought in the Asian theatre - closing down an entire continent of front to the war. The rest of the Cold War would be fought in Central Asia (and eventually in the Middle East), and in Europe. Of course, the United States knew from very early that it was going to lose in Vietnam: the Pentagon Papers discussed this in great detail. The United States was there on a cost imposition exercise. The result it found in the alliance with China was a mutually satisfactory way to close the conflict. In this regard China didn't win the Vietnam war either. > The various potential military hotspots – Vietnam, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea – would probably be in much the same state if the US-China deal never happened. I have no idea. That's 60 years of alternative history to imagine. Fascinating, but not clear. > Many people say that Nixon's decision was a great strategic move, but I am unconvinced – the US got some short-term assistance against the Soviets which it didn't really need and didn't make much difference anyway; in exchange, the US put itself in a weaker strategic position vis-à-vis China for many decades to come. This seems to be a rising opinion in the National Security Core of the United States, and also seems to be the take of the new Trump Administration. Personally I see this as historical revisionism, contextualized by modern concerns over historical accuracy. I fully agree that China and it's potential rise are considered by the National Security State of the American Government to be a dark horse scenario, and a greater potential spoiler to American hegemony than Russia (a waning power) today. I understand how someone could mistake the situation we are in today with a security outlook at China's rise and want to throw out some of the alliance concessions because in this day and age they are inconvenient. We've seen that before in history (indeed, in American history) and so it's congruent with the kind of behavior we would expect. > China's economic development since the 1980s has provided many economic benefits to the US and its allies. But, that still could have happened even if there was a more assertive US policy towards PRC I think all of this is very accurate, provided there was _some_ deal to get an alliance. Had it been possible for the United States to do that without recognizing PRC, I serious doubt. But yeah, if that had been possible, I think much of the geoeconomic situation would have looked the same.