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I like these guides by AP journalist Jonathan Stray: https://source.opennews.org/en-US/learning/security-journalists-part-one-basics/ https://source.opennews.o
by danso 10y ago
I like these guides by AP journalist Jonathan Stray:
https://source.opennews.org/en-US/learning/security-journalists-part-one-basics/ https://source.opennews.org/en-US/learning/security-journali...
https://source.opennews.org/en-US/learning/security-journalists-part-two-threat-modeling/ https://source.opennews.org/en-US/learning/security-journali...
In general, I think the two things that activists and journalists need to do that they often don't do, yet is a very common attack vector:
1. Enable two-factor auth on all accounts, especially their email.
2. Care about proper access control.
#2 is something I see violated quite frequently by tech novices, as it is a fairly mundane detail. Such as giving everyone admin level access to the org's Wordpress installation, and someone inevitably gets phished. And then there's the even more common problem of not revoking access when a member leaves.
And of course, phishing seems by far the most common way that groups get hacked. The recent U.S. election is the new canonical example, but I believe it's been the downfall of many other high profile orgs, such as the Associated Press and HBGary.
- tptacek 10y agoI have some quibbles with this (the first, practical, checkbox guide post; not so much the longer, abstract policy one). * At-risk users should disable SMS 2FA, and favor code-generating applications instead. It takes some effort to disable SMS, but that effort is worthwhile, because SMS is quite insecure. * The guide correctly notes that attachment are dangerous, but isn't very pragmatic about how to handle that danger. I think the right answer is: establish a rule that you won't be using email attachments to transmit documents. If you can be sure of the provenance of a file, you don't need an error-prone dance to pre-screen it before opening it on your desktop. * The guide wildly overstates the value of full disk encryption. FDE handles almost exclusively a single threat: the physical threat of your unattended computer. Alter any of those words, and FDE does essentially nothing. You should, of course, enable FDE. You should not have high expectations about what it accomplishes.
- danso 10y agoI think the risk of your unattended computer being compromised is quite low for the average journalist, but don't activists in the field face increased danger of having their laptops/property seized during an arrest? It could be an activist participating in a march who happens to bring their laptop bag with them. Yes, ideally, people would have a policy not to engage in a protest while carrying laptops, but I could see activists who do the mobile-multimedia thing (shoot, process video/photos in the field) just being used to having their laptops out at all times. I think the option of FDE is important to mention because I'm thinking the average non-techie thinks that having a password on their laptop prevents the (easy) reading of files when the laptop is confiscated.
- tptacek 10y agoThe unattended compromise scenario is that your laptop is grabbed out of your house or car in a breakin, or left in your backpack in a bar or a cab, which happens all the time even to savvy people. Full disk encryption contains that catastrophe so that all you lose is your data and not your privacy. It doesn't really protect you in any other scenario. In particular: if you can use your computer without a password, it is not at that moment protected by FDE.
- hackuser 10y ago> FDE handles almost exclusively a single threat: the physical threat of your unattended computer. For most FDE solutions, doesn't the computer have to be off or possibly in hibernation (suspend to disk)? Does sleep mode (effectively suspend to memory?) activate the FDE? IME, most people's computers are almost always on or asleep. EDIT: File-level encryption seems better: All files are encrypted except when open. But I don't know if there are any solutions that implement it securely and useably.
- tptacek 10y agoA decent middle ground is encrypted disk images. You're getting inferior encryption (it'll be sector-level wide-block unauthenticated encryption), but at least you'll have to unlock and lock things as you use them. There used to be an OS X tool called Vault that managed these with a simple, pretty UI. Unfortunately, it was discontinued. We may put something like it together, but we suck at UI. Stuff like this, by the way, is why I get so aggravated by UI/UX/Frontend developers who build new encrypted messengers --- the world doesn't need more encrypted messengers, but badly needs more UI/UX help with existing tools (I'd be happy to build the backend for such a thing and sign the IP over to an effective front-end developer).
- Buge 10y agoIf you are worried about phishing (you should be) don't use SMS or code-based two-factor. They can and are being phished. Use U2F (yubikeys). They are phishing proof.
- bigiain 10y agoFWIW, I recently got a YubiKey Fido - their U2F-only version, and a disappointingly small number of sites I care about have implemented U2F... It's also website-in-Chrome only right now - which is a little limiting, no help protecting your mobile devices. (Not that any of the other usb 2FA devices are gonna work too well on iOS either...) I'm not sure how up-to-date this page is, but there's a stark difference between ticks in the OTP column and the U2F column... (Apart from that, it seems to be a well made bit of kit - but I think I'm gonna spend the extra and order a Yubikey 4 or Nano...)