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Slightly off topic but related to the product: how can a device using Android be considered safe and trustworthy privacy wise? The maker can surely choose FOSS
by squarefoot 10y ago
Slightly off topic but related to the product: how can a device using Android be considered safe and trustworthy privacy wise? The maker can surely choose FOSS only Android and encrypt communications, but the moment they add a binary only device driver it can do whatever it wants since it runs with kernel privileges (ie, sniff virtual keyboard, listen to conversations, access messages, contacts, photos, documents etc).
If I'm not mistaken (please correct me in case I am) there's still no phone out there with open device drivers, which IMO translates into giving only a false sense of security to the user.
Moreover, if I buy a security oriented device and it has a remote kill switch, I would expect at least to be the one and only entity in control of it.
- Tepix 10y agoYou're right in that a binary blob may just contain a backdoor and analyzing it is very hard. There is Replicant ( http://www.replicant.us/ http://www.replicant.us/ ), a version of Android that aims to get rid of all binary blobs. There is also CopperheadOS ( https://copperhead.co/android/ https://copperhead.co/android/ ). Related reading: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/mission-improbable-hardening-android-security-and-privacy https://blog.torproject.org/blog/mission-improbable-hardenin...
- timonovici 10y agoReplicant got rid of all the binary blobs (for the main OS, that is), is not just aiming. The effects are of course that you can't use wifi, unless you're using a USB dongle. Not only that, but Replicant is only ported to devices where the GSM chip can be securely turned off (in other words, it's a separate chip, under the control of the main proccesor); Also, the GSM and GPS chips should be separate. The baseband OS if ofcourse still proprietary, but it can be considered an acceptable tradeof, given that it's only connected to the main processor via a USB-like connection (HSIC). Shameless plug: we sell preinstalled Replicant phones at https://tehnoetic.com/ https://tehnoetic.com/
- raesene9 10y agoHaving a FOSS phone would only be considered trustworthy if it had been reviewed by an entity you trust. I'm not aware of any mainstream OS that has been fully reviewed for security, so realistically the concept of a "trustworthy" device in that sense doesn't exist. Even if such an audit was done perfectly (a very serious and difficult undertaking), it would be a point in time assessment, so would become less relevant as new code was committed. Basically you have to trust some group of people to run a modern computing device/environment, it's just a question of who and how much...
- mindslight 10y agoProprietary software starts off with a high level of trust - trusting just one company. But it can never progress past this. The advantage of FOSS is that the set of who can audit the code is open. It starts small, but grows with popularity and remains agile - eg doesn't necessitate transitively trusting whatever nation-states a single company is vulnerable to.
- raesene9 10y agoUnfortunately can audit and do audit are very different things. I'd agree absolutely FOSS has a higher possible level of trust than a proprietary solution, however in practice I don't think it's necessarily the case. To take one example with a propietary solution with code from a single company, it is possible for a level of background checking to be done on all contributors. With a FOSS solution, that's just not possible, so you get risks like what if one of the contributors is being paid by a nation state who would like to place a specific bug/vulnerability into a codebase. Of course in practice the world is much muddier than that as pretty much all propietary software vendors make ample use of code they did not write, and in many cases on open source code that they don't really controle the provenance of. Personally I'd say the idea of having a high level of trust in any larg'ish software stack is very dubious these days given the likely incentives of various groups to compromise them.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"Proprietary software starts off with a high level of trust - trusting just one company. But it can never progress past this." The first systems that were trustworthy were done by proprietary companies with independent evaluation of the product, signatures on source/binaries, and/or optional generation from source on-site. This became standard practice in security- and safety-critical development. You can scale it to as many people available for review often under NDA for the source itself but not signatures or binaries.
- mseebach 10y agoMost practical security measures are about striking a (better) balance between practicality and security. You're probably right that there is no viable device without binary blobs, but if the (corporate security policy) conclusion from this is that you can't use smartphones at all, practical experience shows that people will be using their private (vastly less secure) phones. In that case, it's way better to provide a much more, if not perfectly, secure phone (and sensible policies for using it). At least, this is the market I perceive the Blackphone to be addressing.
- lallysingh 10y agoSafe and trustworthy aren't binary values. They're probabilities that the system won't release private information to undesired actors. To calculate those, you have to do your own risk assessment. Remember that a risk assessment for privacy has to put the value of the privacy against the cost of security -- on your side. On the attacker's side, it's the value of whatever they can learn about you vs their costs in getting past whatever defenses you have. Generally that results in going one of two ways: you trust a 3rd party vendor for some of it, or you build the damn thing yourself from small parts. And unless you've got a silicon fab at home, or are buying a shitload of transistors off of digikey, you're going to be trusting some 3rd parties. In my book, a remote kill switch is OK if you can also trigger it. For privacy, DOS is pretty harmless -- you don't lose privacy, you just lose access to some data/service. If, in exchange of a risk of DOS, I can get better privacy some other way, I'll take it. As for SC fighting counterfeiters, I don't blame them. They're not making much $$ these days, and this is a way to keep alive without hurting their actual customers.
- awqrre 10y agoYour text messages, voice calls and browsing history are analyzed by Google using automated software so there is nothing to worry about... (it is used only for targeted ad purposes) /s
- Nomentatus 10y agoUnless you either live in a "five eyes" country, or live in a country that isn't one of the five eyes.