4 ms·

Whether or not one agrees with it, the idea of arbitrary restrictions on representative government is at least as old as George Washington himself. Were the US

Whether or not one agrees with it, the idea of arbitrary restrictions on representative government is at least as old as George Washington himself. Were the USA a direct democracy it would be pretty easy to refute the idea of term limits, but as it's a democratic republic, the issue becomes far less clear cut.

nkozyra 10y ago
Even direct democracies have restrictions; it's the arbitrary ones that need some real validation to support. Just cause "throw all the bums out" feels good does not mean it's sound policy for a republic.
- pzxc 10y ago
  It was arbitrary for George Washington to decline to run for a third term as President, feeling that two terms ought to be enough for anybody. And it took over a century for that wisdom to be codified into the 22nd Amendment.
- handedness 10y ago
  It doesn't require much abstract thinking to see how legislators (and chief executives) could craft policy to guarantee their reelection. Places without term limits are good examples of how policy can ensure reelection. Whether or not one agrees with it, the concept, at least, of term limits, isn't wholly without merit. It may be feckless, it may be antithetical to the direct democracy many Americans inaccurately assume they live in, but it isn't inherently just some partisan, feel-good policy. This particular implementation of the concept may be, but that's a separate conversation.
gozur88 10y ago
Congressional representatives are chosen directly by the people in their districts. Aside from judges, are there any federal office holders or appointments that don't have term limits or serve at the pleasure of the current administration?
- phonon 10y ago
  Head of CFPB? Can't be removed by the President. Also, President can't fire SEC commissioners
  - gozur88 10y ago
    From the wiki page: "The CFPB was initially established as an independent agency but it effectively became an executive agency after a federal appeals court found that the President of the United States' power to remove the CFPB Director had been unconstitutionally limited." And while the president can't fire an SEC commissioner, there are only five and one comes up for reappointment every year. By the end of his first term Trump will have the opportunity to replace four of them.
    - phonon 10y ago
      The CFPB ruling will (is?) certainly to be appealed. Besides the SEC, you also have the FTC, FCC, CFTC, CPSC, PCAOB etc run by groups of Directors who can't be fired at will. The FHFA and OCC are led by single Directors. See the "Ground for Removal" section in https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf Grounds for Removal Although not always specified in statute, it appears that the heads of financial regulators, in contrast with Cabinet Secretaries, typically do not serve at the pleasure of the President (“at will”). Instead, most regulators may be removed only if a higher “for cause” threshold is met. The one clear statutory exception is the OCC’s Comptroller of the Currency, who “shall hold his office for a term of five years unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.” “For cause” removal limits the ability of a President to remove, or threaten to remove, an appointee solely for political reasons. According to one law review article, “The distinguishing feature of [independent] agencies is that their principal officers are protected against presidential removal at will.” According to another, A requirement that members serve a fixed term of years is an essential element of independence, but alone is not sufficient. The critical element of independence is the protection—conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied—against removal except “for cause.”

nkozyra 10y ago

Even direct democracies have restrictions; it's the arbitrary ones that need some real validation to support. Just cause "throw all the bums out" feels good does not mean it's sound policy for a republic.

pzxc 10y ago
It was arbitrary for George Washington to decline to run for a third term as President, feeling that two terms ought to be enough for anybody. And it took over a century for that wisdom to be codified into the 22nd Amendment.
handedness 10y ago
It doesn't require much abstract thinking to see how legislators (and chief executives) could craft policy to guarantee their reelection. Places without term limits are good examples of how policy can ensure reelection. Whether or not one agrees with it, the concept, at least, of term limits, isn't wholly without merit. It may be feckless, it may be antithetical to the direct democracy many Americans inaccurately assume they live in, but it isn't inherently just some partisan, feel-good policy. This particular implementation of the concept may be, but that's a separate conversation.

gozur88 10y ago

Congressional representatives are chosen directly by the people in their districts. Aside from judges, are there any federal office holders or appointments that don't have term limits or serve at the pleasure of the current administration?

phonon 10y ago
Head of CFPB? Can't be removed by the President. Also, President can't fire SEC commissioners
- gozur88 10y ago
  From the wiki page: "The CFPB was initially established as an independent agency but it effectively became an executive agency after a federal appeals court found that the President of the United States' power to remove the CFPB Director had been unconstitutionally limited." And while the president can't fire an SEC commissioner, there are only five and one comes up for reappointment every year. By the end of his first term Trump will have the opportunity to replace four of them.
  - phonon 10y ago
    The CFPB ruling will (is?) certainly to be appealed. Besides the SEC, you also have the FTC, FCC, CFTC, CPSC, PCAOB etc run by groups of Directors who can't be fired at will. The FHFA and OCC are led by single Directors. See the "Ground for Removal" section in https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf Grounds for Removal Although not always specified in statute, it appears that the heads of financial regulators, in contrast with Cabinet Secretaries, typically do not serve at the pleasure of the President (“at will”). Instead, most regulators may be removed only if a higher “for cause” threshold is met. The one clear statutory exception is the OCC’s Comptroller of the Currency, who “shall hold his office for a term of five years unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.” “For cause” removal limits the ability of a President to remove, or threaten to remove, an appointee solely for political reasons. According to one law review article, “The distinguishing feature of [independent] agencies is that their principal officers are protected against presidential removal at will.” According to another, A requirement that members serve a fixed term of years is an essential element of independence, but alone is not sufficient. The critical element of independence is the protection—conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied—against removal except “for cause.”