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'Shimmers' are the newest tool for stealing credit card info
- blakesterz 10y agoKrebs has a post on this as well: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/atm-shimmers-target-chip-based-cards/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/atm-shimmers-target-chip... “The only way for this attack to be successful is if a [bank card] issuer neglects to check the CVV when authorizing a transaction,”
- Pfhreak 10y agoI have not had the largest confidence in banks abilities to understand security. I've personally dealt with: 1) 'Two factor auth is on, you have to answer two security questions to access your account!' 2) 'Your password is limited to exactly 8 characters ... for security' 3) 'Oh, we now support SMS two factor auth' -- 4 months in, I've received 1 SMS challenge 4) 'You don't want a chip card, they are more hassle' 5) 'We allow systems like Mint to access your account when you have 2 factor auth on. No, you cannot opt out.' Yeah, don't have the highest confidence that my bank(s) actually understand how to keep things safe.
- ChrisClark 10y ago> 1) 'Two factor auth is on, you have to answer two security questions to access your account!' That's awful! By using the two-factor wording it's deliberately misleading people who don't know much about it.
- luck_fenovo 10y ago> 'You don't want a chip card, they are more hassle' I got exactly that line fairly recently. To be fair, it probably is much more of a hassle from what I've heard, so they're not wrong, exactly. It seems like the chip+pin rollout has been bungled pretty terribly.
- gregschlom 10y agoMay I suggest switching banks? And while you're at it, you may want to look into a credit union rather than a corporate bank.
- JumpCrisscross 10y ago> You don't want a chip card, they are more hassle As a consumer, I am indemnified by my bank, per Regulation E, against fraud from swipes. I get no benefit from the slower chip + sig system.
- gozur88 10y agoUgh! This is my pet peeve. My brokerage house will reset your password (which is fine) and convert your account back to single factor authentication (which is... WTF?!) if you answer the security questions over the phone. What was the point of getting that stupid fob when any idiot can bypass it if he knows my mother's maiden name?
- mannykannot 10y agoIn which case, I hope no-one but the bank is liable for the cost of the fraud.
- ourmandave 10y agoUnlike skimmers, a shimmer — named for its slim profile — fits inside a card reader... So shouldn't it be called a sLimmer?
- ry_ry 10y agoSlimming sheds pounds, this accumulates them.
- ioioiosdrt99 10y agoWhen can we expect NLP to "get" this?
- puddintane 10y agoI believe the idea is it is shimmied into the slot?
- jcl 10y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shim_(spacer) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shim_(spacer)
- lostlogin 10y agoShimming things adds stuff and even out the field/load/distribution in stuff I do. E.g. I'd say that balancing a cars wheel was done by adding a shim.
- caconym_ 10y agoI'm having a surprising amount of trouble finding this information online: does the "chip" include some functionality (maybe called iCVV or dCVV) that allows it to individually "sign" transactions using internal secret keys, or does it not? This was my understanding of why the new system was supposed to be safer. If the answer is yes, secret keys that never leave the chip are used to sign each transaction and the signature is verified by the bank, I'm not sure how these "shimmers" would be useful, since the secret key would presumably not be compromised and so the shimmer may obtain some data identifying the card and transaction but not the ability to sign new transactions. If the answer is no, none of this is happening, then I'm not sure what the point of the switch was in the first place. Maybe the answer is something in between? Banks suck, so they've implemented chip cards in a half-assed way with gaping security holes?
- jrkatz 10y agoNot all terminals in the States support chip functionality, so for the time being chip & pin cards here still have normal mag strips and can be run as older, regular cards - the mag strips can still be read/stolen & used.
- lvh 10y agoThat's true, but the shimmers in question clearly have smart card pins. What you're describing is the traditional skimmer; a shimmer is not merely a thinner skimmer. These devices read the data between the chip and the terminal. This would be fine, if payment processing consistently used iCVV/EMV, but it turns out they don't.
- sly010 10y agoAnd it's unlikely that this will change anytime soon due to the lack on incentives on all sides. Funny as it may be my debit card for some reason has a $500 (unmodifiable) limit on chip&pin purchases, but it has no such limit for swipe purchases. When I asked them how is that more secure, I got a verbal shoulder shrug. Banks are in the business of underwriting. I believe at least on the corporate level they probably don't like the idea of fully secure, verifiable payments, because that would mean you don't need them anymore.
- alistproducer2 10y agoI would argue that numbers skimmed from retail stores are the stores responsibility. Even in a large store there's aren't that many POSs. They should have a procedure for checking the POS before close or on open.
- djrogers 10y agoLots of comments here about magstripes and the failure of the US banks to get rid of them. Funny thing about that is this is a Canadian article about this happening in Canada, and shimmers actually steal data off chips - not magstripes. Why would they do this? The assumption is that the thieves plan to use the chip data to create fake magstripe card or make online purchases somewhere that the CVV is not checked. Not checking the CVV is a complete failure, and apparently for once it's not a US failure (unless the thieves are targeting tourists??).
- msbarnett 10y agoThe article is lite on specifics, but my Canadian chip card will normally reject stripe transactions in Canada (or it did the last time I saw a stripe machine, several years ago), but happily perform them when I cross into the US. So one possibility is that they're stealing magstripe data off the chips for cloning and use in the US banking system.
- eeZah7Ux 10y agoThat sneaky comment about using NFC instead.
- uladzislau 10y agoThis happened to me recently when my card data was stolen in a very respectable place where I've been a long time patron. It was totally unpleasant surprise. Right the next day the fraudulent transactions on my card started to popup all over the world - Beijing, North Carloina, etc. My bank promptly blocked the card - but I had to deal with the pain of calling in, going over my transactions list, verifying my identity and then waiting 2 weeks for a new card in the mail.
- marcoperaza 10y agoFuture tip: If you really need the card (or even if you don't), you can usually get the replacement card overnighted to you if you're insistent on the phone, at least in my experience.
- ashread123 10y agosteal credit crd info, get bank transfers, cheques and all other hacking related jobs. direct all to 19193076946
- gambiting 10y agoI haven't actually physically inserted my card into a machine for at least 2 years now. It's contactless everywhere. If the transaction is more than ~$50 it just asks for my pin and that's it. Maybe we should just introduce this everywhere and then see how criminals can possibly break it?
- jlg23 10y agoKeep on waiting. Every single transaction method has been broken. If not the method itself, the environment in which it has been used. Your personal experience is not a valid scientific reasoning. If it was: "I have not used more than maestro cards and my 4-digit pin in 4 years. I did not have a single fraudulent transcation for 4 years now. [...] Maybe we should just use this everywhere!"
- pitaa 10y agoI'm assuming you're not in the US? I used to have contactless cards on all my accounts until they started rolling out chip cards, at which point they sent me replacements with chips but no contactless functionality. I've considered calling the issuers to see if they can still get me one, but I dread the thought of trying to explain the difference between a chip card and a contactless card - it was hard enough the first time before chip cards became a thing!
- ZenoArrow 10y agoContactless is even less secure than chip and pin. You can literally read card details out of someone's wallet without them having any way to tell. Even if someone uses a wallet that guards against this sort of attack, they're still vulnerable at the point of use. http://youtu.be/x3S_6EJCjn0 http://youtu.be/x3S_6EJCjn0 http://youtu.be/vmajlKJlT3U http://youtu.be/vmajlKJlT3U
- gambiting 10y agoThat's RFID. Yeah, you can read that with a $5 reader off ebay. I'm talking about Visa PayWave/Mastercard PayPass - both work through NFC and won't surrender any data to a normal reader, you need an authorized terminal that can give an authorization key valid for a given time. There were some attacks against it, but you can't just swipe a card through a wallet, it's extremely time sensitive and requires access to a valid terminal.
- ChuckMcM 10y agoSo at some level there is an issue with the "inside" aspect of card readers. If you had four guide posts and you just pressed your card against the pogo pins would it make it harder to interpose?
- ZenoArrow 10y agoAgreed, this type of device could be easy to detect with some simple upgrades to the card readers. However, the cost of upgrading card reader hardware at all vulnerable banks and retailers is unlikely to be small.
- code_duck 10y agoMany businesses in the USA have recently upgraded or will be soon... It would be a shame of they installed new terminals that were flawed from the start.
- johndbeatty 10y agoNote this is in Canada -- unfortunately there's still a lot of Offline Plaintext PIN cards there. See CreditCall's blog on the subject: https://www.level2kernel.com/blog/2012/02/sda-and-plaintext-offline-pin-to-go/ https://www.level2kernel.com/blog/2012/02/sda-and-plaintext-...
- redbluff 10y agoThanks for this - I was wondering how they got the PIN considering plain text offline PIN has been deprecated for years. My understanding is that the liability shift is in effect for plaintext PINs, but maybe not in the NA/Canada region.
- necula 10y agoCan we not make certain parts of the ATM from a transparent material, like clear plastic? I'm thinking it would be more obvious when the keypad or card slot have been tampered with.
- draw_down 10y ago> "Businesses really need to be checking for these kinds of devices and consumers need to be aware of them." Disagree. Consumers and businesses (ultimately) pay the interchange fees, and this class of problem is the domain of payment infrastructure providers. I'm not interested in keeping vigilant against the latest exploit, and unless the responsibility for dealing with the problem lies with credit card networks and processing gateways they'll have no reason to stop rolling out crappy easily-owned payment tech.
- shawn-butler 10y agoWhat is a good way for a consumer to validate the physical integrity of a box in an essentially unsecured environment?
- rehevkor5 10y agoWhy on earth is the PIN located ON THE CARD?
- xaduha 10y agoIt's not.
- rehevkor5 10y agoThen is the article inaccurate when it says, "Once installed, the microchips on the shimmer record information from chip cards, including the PIN."?
- xaduha 10y agoI don't know the details, but there are probably many possible ways to get the PIN, since it's getting entered right then and there. Smartcard is a small computer, but the connection to it from terminal is probably not that secure and can be read somehow, side-channels or directly. The card decides if the PIN is correct, but it might be possible to record all the PINs that were tried.