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> With more effort That's the new key point for 2017 pro-privacy architectures. Proof of work surveillance doesn't scale because requiring it leverages the di
by ethbro 10y ago
> With more effort
That's the new key point for 2017 pro-privacy architectures.
Proof of work surveillance doesn't scale because requiring it leverages the disparity between the total level of Internet traffic and intelligence agency resources.
Kill the dragnets as step 1, then worry about step 2.
- deathhand 10y agoIt would be helpful to have a website to display a random image of differing sizes for every page load. This would prevent fingerprinting https.
- pixl97 10y agoUm, I don't believe that would help. You either inline the images as data, or better, get rid of all images and have random length non-printing text to hide the real data. This kills caching and performance though.
- btown 10y agohttps://github.com/technion/mod_randpad https://github.com/technion/mod_randpad (an Nginx module that injects padding as a comment into returned HTML documents) is likely the correct layer to add random padding; the performance hit would be negligible.
- fowlslegs 10y agoSD dev here. You might be interested to check out https://github.com/freedomofpress/fingerprint-securedrop https://github.com/freedomofpress/fingerprint-securedrop (note: still in experimental stages). We're going to be using the framework/ ML pipeline to evaluate server-side defenses (e.g., https://petsymposium.org/2017/papers/issue2/paper54-2017-2-source.pdf https://petsymposium.org/2017/papers/issue2/paper54-2017-2-s...), and are also working w/ Tor dev Mike Perry who is working on a solution or set of solutions to the problems of website & circuit fingerprinting with regards to Tor at the protocol level. Edit: What Mike is trying to implement is based on https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.00524.pdf https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.00524.pdf.