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And then killed that convenience by literally bricking counterfeit chips. Most users have no way of knowing whether or not their chips are genuine - and, what's
by kosma 10y ago
And then killed that convenience by literally bricking counterfeit chips. Most users have no way of knowing whether or not their chips are genuine - and, what's worse, most electronics manufacturers have no way of knowing either, because entire supply chains are rotten. These days we have our trusted supplier of FTDI chips but we still check every single shipment. We already had one supplier send us fake chips and then flat out exclaim they did it because "no one would pay premium to get the real thing".
We would.. but since they already cheated, we had to switch suppliers.
- cartoonfoxes 10y agoCan you share which suppliers have you been burned by? We've seen counterfeit Prolific parts, but I'm not aware if we've had similar problems with FTDI hardware.
- kosma 10y agoI don't remember, unfortunately, as I wasn't the one handling logistics, I just spec'd out parts we needed. If anything, here's a bit of advice: don't ever assume your supply chain is 100% clean - more than once we've been sold thousands of dumpster-grade components by a seemingly very reputable company. And don't ever assume suppliers won't try a bait-and-switch; we've been bitten by this more times than I can count.
- nitrogen 10y agoCan the bigger names like Digikey be relied on? Or do their suppliers sometimes give them bad parts, too?
- kosma 10y agoMy point is that even if your supplier plays fair, the manufacturer may change the designs slightly and you either dont't get the PCN or fail to understand the implications of a change. We had a case once where a manufacturer added a minuscule hole on the case of a relay, presumably a pressure vent. Our devices are potted in resin in order to withstand rough conditions; in this particular case the resin penetrated the relay and blocked the contacts. We were halfway through a production run before anyone noticed. Needless to say, the run had to be scraped because there's no economical way to remove the resin once it's hardened. All for a saving of a few cents per relay. QA lesson: new batch of anything = tight quality control. When you go into manufacturing, it becomes a game of numbers. Manufacturing 10000 of whatever is statistically bound to generate some duds and failures. Speaking of prototype/hobbyist amounts: stick to the big suppliers and you should be safe, but if something feels fishy, don't be shy to order the part from a different supplier. Generally, identifying counterfeit parts in prototype amounts can be tricky without prior experience because your manual soldering skills will always be sub-par to a pick'n'placer; same goes for ESD precautions, accidental shocks applied to the circuit, passerby finger-pokers and your curious boss.
- i336_ 10y agoThanks so much for clarifying the specifics of what happened to you; this is one of those situations that's hard to imagine, making it that much harder to envisage exactly what can go wrong, where and how. What I'm wondering now is whether it's possible to somehow financially insure a specific level of quality control (translation: sticking to the blueprints!) in a way that doesn't scare everyone off. I'm guessing the scrapped run had to be eaten on your side? :/
- kosma 10y agoWhenever I see an inexperienced young hardware startup striving to build even just 1000 of some widget, I feel sorry for them. They often go twice over the planned budget both in terms of time and money... and only after several screwups they hire some experienced guys to help them with the process. The answer to your question? It simply experience. Start small, try to build bigger things, and put in actual time and effort to learn. Don't cut corners; learn how the big industry does things (and especially: why). Don't guess tolerances and sizes: find relevant standards. Read datasheet thoroughly and with comprehension. Ask your assembly house for guidance. Get a book or two on process & quality control. The effort you invest will pay itself off sooner than you think. Not in revenue, mind you - but greatly reduced losses and delays. PS. The world of manufacturing is wonderful. It's vastly different from programming, as it involves much more interaction with suppliers, vendors, teams and assembly line employees - but the feeling of holding a finished product in your hand is worth it.
- i336_ 10y agoThanks very much for this info. For a few years now I've wanted to build a handheld device that captures the essence of Lisp machines, Forth, and systems like the Commodore 64 and Canon Cat, in a portably accessible/usable form, wrapped in a highly pocketable but ruggedized enclosure similar to the old Nokias that lasted forever. I envisage it primarily as a teaching device and something people could hack on for fun, but the whole idea has never been especially practical or marketable. Now I know what it might be for (when I have a bit of money) - manufacturing education :) since device production has always been something I'm interested in and I do want some experience. I also want to build a handheld device with a 2G+ baseband, secure boot, and an open-source firmware (perhaps seL4, most definitely not Android). The possibilities start with end-to-end encrypted SMS and trail off infinitely. I haven't really thought of what might be possible; I'm just stuck on the academic problem of secure boot - which is quite an issue, as not even Apple (just checked, $641B valuation right now) seem to be able to get this right: https://ramtin-amin.fr/#nvmedma https://ramtin-amin.fr/#nvmedma. I'm saddened by the fact that all secure boot implementations seem to either be NDA-laden, based on security by obscurity, or both. I'm yet to find something I feel would be hard for even someone with a very very large pile of money (for arbitrary scaling of "very very large") to break. I realize that given infinite money everything is breakable, but current "secure" defenses seem to fall over much too readily IMO. (Eg, secure boot implementations have to have test modes; have these passed stringent code verification? A properly-formed legal case could subpoena any secure boot implementation's source code. This is assuming the likely-overly-idealistic case where there are no deliberate backdoors.)