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The first step is buying the right laptop. In this day and age, even hardware can have backdoors. You'd want something devoid of such backdoors (or the potent
by yellowapple 10y ago
The first step is buying the right laptop. In this day and age, even hardware can have backdoors. You'd want something devoid of such backdoors (or the potential thereof, which tends to put a dependency on open hardware) and fully compatible with open software (not necessarily free, but it tends to help) all the way down to the firmware.
Transparency is a dependency of trust. If any component lacks transparency, then it cannot be trusted. Period.
This means neither macOS nor FileVault are sufficient; neither are transparent, and therefore neither are trustworthy. Even a fully-free operating system like a Linux distro or OpenBSD is insufficient if you rely on closed-source drivers or firmware.
Next step is to detect tampering. This means that your laptop needs to prevent booting any operating system unless you've signed it with some private key, and needs to clear any full-disk encryption keys if any attempt is made at physical tampering. This is also the step where you ensure the physical security of that machine.
Once you've established physical security and full-stack transparency, you can start worrying about the encryption itself (which will need to be much stronger than the norm) and about sandboxing untrustworthy software.
Really, the only perfectly-secure computer is an incinerated computer. The best anyone can do is minimize the opportunities for such a state-level actor to, well, act. Transparency, tamper-resistance, cryptography, and isolation are the keys, and even the slightest error or concession for "convenience" can and will permit the likes of the NSA to actually infiltrate your systems.