5 ms·
> this feels wrong, though I can't quite pin point why. It's unusual for a root CA to be run by a service that otherwise has nothing to do with CA issuance, fo
by JoshTriplett 10y ago
> this feels wrong, though I can't quite pin point why.
It's unusual for a root CA to be run by a service that otherwise has nothing to do with CA issuance, for the primary purpose of issuing certificates for that service's first-party sites, and not for third-party sites. I can't think of a single other example of a single-purpose root CA like this.
(The announcement mentions that they might use this to operate as a CA for third-party sites as well, but right now it exists to certify first-party sites.)
- niels_olson 10y ago> I can't think of a single other example of a single-purpose CA like this. Department of Defense: http://www.disa.mil/enterprise-services/identity-and-access-management/pki-pke http://www.disa.mil/enterprise-services/identity-and-access-...
- rmhrisk 10y agoThere are numerous, Microsoft has its own subordinate CA that they operate for their own certificates. Amazon has its own root CA https://www.amazontrust.com/repository/ https://www.amazontrust.com/repository/. There are more as well.
- inopinatus 10y agoAmazon is using their CA for issuing customer ELB/Cloudfront certificates, not just their own stuff, and not even all of it: the cert I see at https://amazon.com's https://amazon.com's is Symantec-issued.
- algesten 10y agoI guess if NSA/FBI forces google to hand over the CA keys, they kan orchestrate undetectable MITM-attacks. I wonder why browser won't automatically store the fingerprint for every HTTPS-certificate it encounters and throw up a fuzz to the user if a certificate changes without any good reason?
- tlrobinson 10y agoIt's opt-in by the site, but that's what public key pinning is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning
- algesten 10y agoThat's a bit different though, because you must pin an issuing key, not the actual cert.
- buzer 10y agoIt's risky for browsers to do it automatically since it's not something that sites are excepting. Some might be using different certificates on different servers for same domain for example. It's possible for sites to instruct browsers to do it though, but that's opt-in. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=HTTP_Public_Key_P...
- infogulch 10y agoWhy aren't new certificates for the same domain signed by the old (perhaps expired) certificate (recursively) in addition to the whole CA model? This proves that whoever has the new cert used to have the old cert. A browser would save a copy of a certificate the first time it visits a site, then when it visits again later it could request the chain of certs back to the first one it ever encountered. Past certs verify new certs; this check wouldn't even involve a CA. This basically overlays trust-on-first-use security model on top of the CA security model and would make it much more difficult to perform a MITM on sites that the user regularly visits (which are probably the most valuable targets).
- JoshTriplett 10y agoYou'd need a backup plan for sites that have transferred ownership, or for sites that needed to revoke the old key due to compromise. And once you have that backup plan, how would you decide whether to care if that additional signature exists?
- tptacek 10y agoThis is not in fact all that unusual at all.
- JoshTriplett 10y agoI've seen many examples of non-root CAs for such purposes, but it seems unusual (though not completely unheard-of) among root CAs. I dug through Mozilla's standard certificate bundle, and found very few such certificates. Amazon has one, but they also use that to issue certificates through AWS. Someone elsewhere in the thread mentioned a DoD root CA. The certificate store has some certificates from companies like Dell; no idea what they use those for. Who else has a root CA used exclusively for first-party certification? In any case, I was only trying to suggest why this seemed odd, based in part on the availability heuristic: whether this is a common practice or not, it doesn't seem like something people (even people who regularly read about changes or events in the CA landscape) would see regularly.
- rmhrisk 10y agoIt's actually quite common, another example is Amazon who operates its own root for its SSL certificate needs. Additionally, there is minimal risk profile differences to an unconstrained subordinate CA (like GIAG2 or the equivalent Microsoft subordinate) and a root. One could argue the risk is in fact reduced for a large issuer to be independent because of fewer entities can negativly impact operations.