5 ms·

I don't think I follow your reasoning of how increased security increases the severity of a compromise. Can you elaborate on that?

nothrabannosir 10y ago
It lowers the barrier to adopting "login with facebook" on other platforms. "You get 2fa for free!"
OJFord 10y ago
If my network knows that I use PGP to login, they may well accept an (illegitimate) announcement that I'm changing my keys to {attacker-generated.asc}. Of course, really such a login key should only be able to authenticate, and my network should only accept a proper revocation certificate that would need to have been generated by a different key with the 'Certify' action enabled. How likely or damaging that is obviously depends a lot on who you are, and probably wouldn't be for many people at all. But I assume that's the sort of thing your parent commenter is alluding to.
- corey_moncure 10y ago
  Why would your network accept that announcement if it wasn't signed with your signing key?
forgottenpass 10y ago
It doesn't increase severity in and of itself, it just changes the nature of the system. And people will adapt their decision making processes to the new properties of that system. Facebook would feel more comfortable expanding their scope of features in a way that increases severity. -- For example, my primary objection to using my facebook account to log into unrelated websites isn't about privacy, it's that I think I can manage unique credentials for each one better than adding facebook as a shared point of failure and risking a cascade if my facebook account gets compromised. Contacts would assume a higher degree of authenticity to actions done with my account. It only sets the stage for the change, it doesn't implement it. I know the tech bubble likes to pretend speculation around obvious system effects is 100% unfounded if it might lead to even-the-slightest-bit-unflattering conclusions. But I don't play that game.

nothrabannosir 10y ago

It lowers the barrier to adopting "login with facebook" on other platforms. "You get 2fa for free!"

OJFord 10y ago

If my network knows that I use PGP to login, they may well accept an (illegitimate) announcement that I'm changing my keys to {attacker-generated.asc}. Of course, really such a login key should only be able to authenticate, and my network should only accept a proper revocation certificate that would need to have been generated by a different key with the 'Certify' action enabled. How likely or damaging that is obviously depends a lot on who you are, and probably wouldn't be for many people at all. But I assume that's the sort of thing your parent commenter is alluding to.

corey_moncure 10y ago
Why would your network accept that announcement if it wasn't signed with your signing key?

forgottenpass 10y ago

It doesn't increase severity in and of itself, it just changes the nature of the system. And people will adapt their decision making processes to the new properties of that system. Facebook would feel more comfortable expanding their scope of features in a way that increases severity. -- For example, my primary objection to using my facebook account to log into unrelated websites isn't about privacy, it's that I think I can manage unique credentials for each one better than adding facebook as a shared point of failure and risking a cascade if my facebook account gets compromised. Contacts would assume a higher degree of authenticity to actions done with my account. It only sets the stage for the change, it doesn't implement it. I know the tech bubble likes to pretend speculation around obvious system effects is 100% unfounded if it might lead to even-the-slightest-bit-unflattering conclusions. But I don't play that game.