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The Guardian headlines (which are still up right now, see https://www.theguardian.com/technology/whatsapp https://www.theguardian.com/technology/whatsapp) refer

The Guardian headlines (which are still up right now, see https://www.theguardian.com/technology/whatsapp https://www.theguardian.com/technology/whatsapp) refer to an "encryption vulnerability" and "security flaw". These are demonstrably false statements, as the letter explains in detail. The Guardian needs to retract and sanction its editor. The story is journalistic malpractice and puts people at risk. This is not about word use, but about publishing stories that are already causing people in high-risk places to move off of a secure messenger to SMS.

tomatsu 10y ago
SMS isn't the only alternative. People who are worried about encryption also won't use SMS. Signal doesn't make that bad trade-off, for example. There are viable alternatives.
- idlewords 10y ago
  Read the letter in full (I'm not being flippant, I mean it sincerely), as it addresses this exact issue. There's empirical evidence that people switch off to SMS. In places like Egypt, people share phones, swap SIM cards routinely, and Signal's nondelivery behavior is a non-starter. Zeynep does research on this and has written a lot about it; it's fascinating (and depressing) reading. The point is that these are not hypothetical scare scenarios. We have the data and that's why it's so urgent to chastise this kind of reckless coverage.
- tptacek 10y ago
  You don't understand the concern. People who are worried about encryption by and large weren't using WhatsApp to begin with. The problem is people who aren't worried about encryption, but should be, and were being silently and effectively helped by WhatsApp's Signal Protocol feature. The only message those people are getting is "WHATSAPP BAD, SWITCH". And switch they are, but not to Signal (none of their friends on are on Signal). Nope, they're adopting insecure alternatives, where they can actually talk to their peers.
  - putlake 10y ago
    If people aren't worried about encryption why are they switching?
    - tptacek 10y ago
      Because people are telling them that WhatsApp is backdoored and that they should switch. They don't know anything about cryptography, but they're not idiots: they know what "bad" means.
      - RodericDay 10y ago
        What are they switching into?
  - deleted 10y ago
    [deleted]
Ar-Curunir 10y ago
It is a security flaw; it's probably not a backdoor. The flaw is as follows: I'm trying to send you a message, but your phone is offline and lost. When you get a new phone, your key has changed, but WhatsApp will deliver my message before informing me of the key change. This applies also to calls and such (which shouldn't be "delivered" if the other person is offline). Why could this be bad? WhatsApp could exploit it as follows (maybe under orders from the govt.): 1) Make it seem like a user lost their phone. 2) Wait for a message to be delivered to the user's account. 3) Bring the user back online with a new key (generated by WhatsApp themselves). 4) Read the "encrypted" message. It's a real vulnerability in the protocol, but the severity depends on your threat model. As I said above, this might be an acceptable trade off for messaging, but not for things like calls, where if the user is offline you don't want the call to go through anyway. All this has been pointed out clearly by the student who discovered it.
- idlewords 10y ago
  It's a security/usability trade-off, not a flaw. Making Signal show white-on-white text would make it more secure against attackers reading over your shoulder. So why doesn't Signal do that? These are legitimate trade-offs that the Guardian is portraying as vulnerabilities.
  - Ar-Curunir 10y ago
    You're being facetious here with the strawman; this is clearly a choice in the protocol that exposes something that is not exposed by, say, Signal. Even if it is a deliberate choice, it doesn't necessarily make it not a flaw; as I said, it depends on your threat model. Anyway, I don't think it's a reasonable choice. How any times do people change phones?!? Even if you're rich you don't do that more than once a year. It doesn't happen often enough for the user to become "accustomed" to warnings and simply click through them.
    - idlewords 10y ago
      I'm not joking here, or making a strawman argument. You could make Signal show white-on-white, so the recipient had to select text to see it. But you don't, because shoulder surfing is not the threat model for Signal. And individually targeted MITM attacks by governments that can take over a server are not the threat model for WhatsApp.
lmm 10y ago
It is a vulnerability and it is a flaw. Do you think this is the first time a group of authoritative experts have tried to claim to the Guardian that their truth-telling is not in the public interest?
- tedunangst 10y ago
  When has this particular group of experts previously claimed that the Guardian's "truth-telling" is not in the public interest?
  - lmm 10y ago
    I'm not saying it's the same group of experts. I'm saying think how it looks from the Guardian's side.
baybal2 10y ago
>refer to an "encryption vulnerability" and "security flaw". These are s, as the letter explains in detail. Referrence to a clear demonstration of a security vulburability in the protocol as a lie, is a demonstrably false statement

tomatsu 10y ago

SMS isn't the only alternative. People who are worried about encryption also won't use SMS. Signal doesn't make that bad trade-off, for example. There are viable alternatives.

idlewords 10y ago
Read the letter in full (I'm not being flippant, I mean it sincerely), as it addresses this exact issue. There's empirical evidence that people switch off to SMS. In places like Egypt, people share phones, swap SIM cards routinely, and Signal's nondelivery behavior is a non-starter. Zeynep does research on this and has written a lot about it; it's fascinating (and depressing) reading. The point is that these are not hypothetical scare scenarios. We have the data and that's why it's so urgent to chastise this kind of reckless coverage.
tptacek 10y ago
You don't understand the concern. People who are worried about encryption by and large weren't using WhatsApp to begin with. The problem is people who aren't worried about encryption, but should be, and were being silently and effectively helped by WhatsApp's Signal Protocol feature. The only message those people are getting is "WHATSAPP BAD, SWITCH". And switch they are, but not to Signal (none of their friends on are on Signal). Nope, they're adopting insecure alternatives, where they can actually talk to their peers.
- putlake 10y ago
  If people aren't worried about encryption why are they switching?
  - tptacek 10y ago
    Because people are telling them that WhatsApp is backdoored and that they should switch. They don't know anything about cryptography, but they're not idiots: they know what "bad" means.
    - RodericDay 10y ago
      What are they switching into?
- deleted 10y ago
  [deleted]

Ar-Curunir 10y ago

It is a security flaw; it's probably not a backdoor. The flaw is as follows: I'm trying to send you a message, but your phone is offline and lost. When you get a new phone, your key has changed, but WhatsApp will deliver my message before informing me of the key change. This applies also to calls and such (which shouldn't be "delivered" if the other person is offline). Why could this be bad? WhatsApp could exploit it as follows (maybe under orders from the govt.): 1) Make it seem like a user lost their phone. 2) Wait for a message to be delivered to the user's account. 3) Bring the user back online with a new key (generated by WhatsApp themselves). 4) Read the "encrypted" message. It's a real vulnerability in the protocol, but the severity depends on your threat model. As I said above, this might be an acceptable trade off for messaging, but not for things like calls, where if the user is offline you don't want the call to go through anyway. All this has been pointed out clearly by the student who discovered it.

idlewords 10y ago
It's a security/usability trade-off, not a flaw. Making Signal show white-on-white text would make it more secure against attackers reading over your shoulder. So why doesn't Signal do that? These are legitimate trade-offs that the Guardian is portraying as vulnerabilities.
- Ar-Curunir 10y ago
  You're being facetious here with the strawman; this is clearly a choice in the protocol that exposes something that is not exposed by, say, Signal. Even if it is a deliberate choice, it doesn't necessarily make it not a flaw; as I said, it depends on your threat model. Anyway, I don't think it's a reasonable choice. How any times do people change phones?!? Even if you're rich you don't do that more than once a year. It doesn't happen often enough for the user to become "accustomed" to warnings and simply click through them.
  - idlewords 10y ago
    I'm not joking here, or making a strawman argument. You could make Signal show white-on-white, so the recipient had to select text to see it. But you don't, because shoulder surfing is not the threat model for Signal. And individually targeted MITM attacks by governments that can take over a server are not the threat model for WhatsApp.

lmm 10y ago

It is a vulnerability and it is a flaw. Do you think this is the first time a group of authoritative experts have tried to claim to the Guardian that their truth-telling is not in the public interest?

tedunangst 10y ago
When has this particular group of experts previously claimed that the Guardian's "truth-telling" is not in the public interest?
- lmm 10y ago
  I'm not saying it's the same group of experts. I'm saying think how it looks from the Guardian's side.

baybal2 10y ago

>refer to an "encryption vulnerability" and "security flaw". These are s, as the letter explains in detail. Referrence to a clear demonstration of a security vulburability in the protocol as a lie, is a demonstrably false statement