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About backdoors in crypto messengers
- dutchbrit 10y agoBlog seems to be down, and cannot find a cached version in Google :(
- larma 10y agohttp://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OSLZXIubGtAJ:blogs.fsfe.org/larma/2017/signal-backdoors/+&cd=1&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=de http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OSLZXIu... works for me (better use text only version as Google tries to load css from the server apparently)
- iuguy 10y agoIf you're considering Google an adversary, perhaps you shouldn't use stock Android, or any of their software. If you're considering Google an adversary, and use a version of Android without Google support, you can't use Signal anyway.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y agoActually, it is possible to use Signal on Android without Google using the opensource microG and Xposed framework (setup is a bit involved...but you can google that :P for a guide).
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoThis still relies on Google's servers to support push messages FYI.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y ago"without Google proprietary code on your phone"
- jacobush 10y agohttps://microg.org/ https://microg.org/ wow never knew about this
- larma 10y agoEven with stock Android, on devices != Pixel or Nexus, Google parts are sandboxed in a way making it hard for them to access private app data. The only way would be to deliver a different app through play store which is easy to discover as it breaks the cryptographic signature and must be done on first install (android uses TOFU). So without the mentioned issues through Play Services and Gboard, Google would not be able to access your Signal messages. On Stock Nexus/Pixel builds they can of course push updates that change this...
- tokenizerrr 10y agoThey can patch the sandbox out in an update, right?
- larma 10y agoOn Pixel and Nexus, yes. for every other device it would require coop with the device manufacturer: they build the open-source code (+ their own proprietary extensions), add google apps and libraries (that are sandboxed) and sign the build. Only they have the private keys to provide updates, Google does not have full device access.
- binaryapparatus 10y agoIt seems that if you really want proper secure channel you need to write one yourself. Anything out there is subject to being compromised. Is there open source alternative for Signal?
- holri 10y agofrom the article: XMPP
- _0ffh 10y agoYou don't have to look far. The actual Signal client source is licensed under GPLv3. Edit: And server code under AGPLv3.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y agowell LibreSignal was shut down because Moxie didn't like them using WhisperSystem's servers. I guess the libre community could figure out how to setup and fund an alternative server, but since Signal's server code isn't federated, then I don't believe there would be a straightforward way to send messages between the two systems. https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165 https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issueco...
- angry_octet 10y agoObviously they can run an alternative server, and if their version is sufficiently more attractive people will switch their client. They could 'solve' all these usability problems, fix the use of google interfaces the tin foil hat brigade detest, and deploy it on a non-existent non-proprietary secure phone platform. Oh and make it federated but keep it immune from spam. Yeah, seems like that is a bit hard.
- vurpo 10y agoMoxie and Whisper Systems is clearly against decentralization and federation, based on that blog post they wrote. This means it's unlikely that Signal is ever going to have any support for federation.
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y ago>tl;dr: There is a “backdoor” in Signal nobody cares about, only Google can use it. Speak for yourself. This backdoor is the reason why I don't use Signal.
- verroq 10y agoYou don't use Signal because your phone manufacturer can put a backdoor in the OS or hardware? Why even use a phone?
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoI don't use Signal because of Google Play Services, which is the backdoor this article refers to. I'm reasonably confident that my phone's OS is uncompromised and I take the radio problem into consideration as part of my threat model and change my behaviors on my phone accordingly. I have also made some progress on using OsmocomBB as a radio baseband, and on building a custom phone that treats the radio as hostile and isolates it as much as possible.
- BuuQu9hu 10y agoWhich device are you using OsmocomBB on? Which custom device are you building? Neo900 looks pretty good for baseband isolation. The phone network and the protocols for connecting to it are pretty user hostile no matter how open and secure the phone and baseband are though. Don't forget the SIM card runs its own insecure OS that people have hacked before and you just can't replace that.
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y ago>Which device are you using OsmocomBB on? A Motorola C139. >Which custom device are you building? A, uh, custom one. >The phone network and the protocols for connecting to it are pretty user hostile no matter how open and secure the phone and baseband are though. >Don't forget the SIM card runs its own insecure OS that people have hacked before and you just can't replace that. Yeah, I'm keeping both of those things in mind. There won't be any assumption that your phone calls or SMS will be secure, but rather that your mainboard OS is secure _from_ the radio and that you don't have to worry about discussions had near your phone and such.
- roddux 10y agoThe backdoor referred to can be applied to any Android app that uses Google Maps. Also mentioned is that using the built-in Google keyboard is a vulnerability, because in theory it gives Google the ability to keylog you. I supposed this boils down to knowing your adversaries. If you number Google amongst that list, life is going to be really difficult - no matter who you are.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y agoYes, any app that uses Google Maps is backdoored, but a secure messaging app needs to be held to a higher security standard than any old app that uses Google Maps. It is still possible to run a phone with Signal without any proprietary google code on your phone (see: microG).
- antihero 10y agoIndeed, but the point is that it's the combination of using GCM and their software that makes this a problem. Because not only does Google know what you're sending, but who you're sending it too, because they have both the OS and the network, they can correlate. I mean yes, it's basically impossible to do this. Even if you used a completely free OS, you still have radio chips to contend with etc.
- jordskott 10y agoI guess it mostly boils down to Moxie and his ridiculous claims of how much more secure Signal is when compared to other solutions (like XMPP and anything based on PGP). Don't get me wrong, I understand the design and user experience decisions of making Signal depending on GCM but Moxie just loves to bash on XMPP and federated protocols and putting Signal on a pedestal of exemplary security. I admire the dedication on putting together the Axolotl protocol but I hate when he mixes his business interests with secure crypto solutions, because by the end of the day that is what he wants, to sell Axolotl to companies like Google and WhatsApp. And of course, bashing on XMPP is just a business pitch to those companies.
- tptacek 10y agoIt's not Moxie doing that, it's virtually the entire community of cryptographic engineers. And Open Whisper Systems is a grant-funded nonprofit that until recently could so barely afford developers they were considering withdrawing their iOS version, so the idea that this is all about Moxie's business interests is horseshit.
- dbalan 10y agoSome observations, 1. At this point its extremely hard to use XMPP - there are too many competing standards that implements encryption (of which a subset has forward secrecy), and if sender server doesn't implement any the other end does, usually falls back to plain text, one can disable it - but this is just too much overhead for a regular user. (food for thought [1]) 2. Again, reminder from countless HN comments - there is a PR in works to make GCM optional[2], as soon as its merged, this will be solved 3. Maps seems to the real problem here: this could be disabled after 2? (otherwise, whats the point?) [1] https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/ [2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/pull/5962 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/pull/5962 edit: formatting, forward secrecy not e2e
- lima 10y agoConversations is a great XMPP client. It works very well, support inline images, stream resumption and everything. The OMEMO standard brings the Signal protocol to XMPP and it works great. I use Conversations for my hacker friends who refuse to install Signal (GCM dependency!) and surprisingly, I'm not missing a lot. Now we only need a desktop client that supports the same features... And iOS (but TextSecure is making progress there)
- BjoernSchiessle 10y ago> Now we only need a desktop client that supports the same features... And iOS For iOS ChatSecure was just released with OMEMO support https://chatsecure.org/blog/chatsecure-v4-released/ https://chatsecure.org/blog/chatsecure-v4-released/ Regarding desktop clients, I can recommand Gajim which also has a OMEMO plugin.
- gcb0 10y agofor the record, firefox for android also integrates the google backdoor for the sole purpose of allowing chromecast for videos... which zero users use or want.
- angry_octet 10y agoSpeak for yourself, Chromecast is very useful. Though obviously you should be able to turn it off.
- gcb0 10y agoit is usefull but not in a browser. firefox will never be better than mx or vlc for video. those apps should have chromecast support.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y agowell FTR, IceCatMobile (downloadable via F-Droid) I doubt would have that backdoor.
- gcb0 10y agocheck the last build date. it's so hard to remove the gapp dependence used for that tiny feature that the icecat maintainers just gave up.
- throw2016 10y agoIt difficult to see how a service that ties to your phone number can make any claim about privacy halfway seriously. This is reckless. And worse tie itself to a company whose business model is based on creepily stalking you all over the internet and getting users psychologically accustomed to the fact they are under surveillance. These are serious escalations that go unnoticed because SV has become a magnet for those who want to profit from it. A half way serious and sincere effort will be open source, not tied in any remote way to known surveillance companies, and based in a country that genuinely respects privacy.
- em3rgent0rdr 10y agoThe claim is secure transport only. They have never made a claim that adversaries won't be able to detect that you are sending encrypted messages.
- tcoppi 10y agoCan we please stop calling these types of vulnerabilities "backdoors"?
- snowpanda 10y agoWhy? It's a backdoor.
- arghwhat 10y agotl;dr: this is stupid. People seem to love analyzing security of tiny corners of systems while ignoring the rest of the system, and entirely avoiding figuring out a scope for the security. The post complains about Signal using a Google service, that Google could utilize (either now or through an update) for malicious activity. A Google service that without a fair share of poking around is only available on Google versions of Android. I mean, what. While this is a more serious problem than the usual whine about GCM (Yes, notifications can give a lot of info, but in case of Signal, the info given is "You received something from some Signal user while you were offline"), it is still amazing how blind the analysis seem to the environment. If you cannot trust Google to provide a "non-evil" Google play services, why the flying fuck do you think the Google-provided (or manufacturer-under-tight-google-control-provided) OS is fine? They could backdoor the process isolation and poke around at Signal memory if they felt like it. Now, if you are security conscious and willing to let go of the conveniences of selling your soul to Google, you would be running a non-Google'd version of Android without Google services. Your only valid complaint in this case, is that Signal depends on Google services to operate, which makes you unable to use it (without hacking Google back into your Android version, but if you do that you might just as well stick to a Google version). Oh, and what about the black box binary drivers you are using on your super-secure handset? Baseband? CPU (ME anyone?)? SIM card? Before you talk about security, figure out what you are trying to protect against, and start from the top. You look like an idiot if you complain about breakable windows but do not notice that the door is open.
- snowpanda 10y agoYour entire comment is based around the "but there are bigger problems" argument. That's like saying you shouldn't fix your leaking engine, if your brakes don't work.
- snowpanda 10y ago>This code is included by calling the createPackageContext-method together with the flags CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE and CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. The latter is a requirement as the android system would deny loading code from untrustworthy sources otherwise (for a good reason). The code is then executed in the Signal process, which includes access to the Signal history database and the crypto keys. --------------------------- Glad someone points out the technical details of why many people had doubts about signal. Unfortunately, Moxie will dismiss it, and his following will claim "it affects other apps too" as if that makes it any better. "Other apps do it too" is not the standard a "privacy" app should aim for.
- symgryph 10y agoOnly for poor Android users. From what I can tell less so with IOS?