A: Market capitalization is of an enterprise, not of a share class. B: I think you're overthinking this a little bit. C: GOOG and GOOGL have subtle difference

A: Market capitalization is of an enterprise, not of a share class. B: I think you're overthinking this a little bit. C: GOOG and GOOGL have subtle differences between them beyond just the voting rights. For example, GOOG != GOOGL. If you have a contract which obligates you to give someone a share of GOOG, a share of GOOGL does not settle that contract. There are some liquidity-related problems, as there is substantial retail interest in Google and retail traders generally disproportionately have access only to one share class. One of my favorite examples for this: back in the day, there were two classes of Chipotle, CMG and CMG.B. They were identical in every way except CMG.B had 5x the voting rights. Which traded at a discount to which? Answer: CMG.B routinely traded at a 10% discount. That's either enough to shake one's faith in the efficient markets hypothesis or it's a powerful illustration that in the short run market microstructure matters A LOT. (I had originally become a shareholder in the A class and started buying B after I was aware of the mispricing. That worked out pretty well. I was far from the only person who realized this, but it was impossible to arbitrage away the difference profitably due to overwhelming short interest in CMG, which meant the cost of borrowing CMG to buy CMG.B and holding them to convergence was untenable. Eventually, some larger institutional buyers just crowded into CMG.B and voted to convert the B shares on a 1:1 basis to the A shares, immediately cutting off their voting power and realizing massive gains.)