I'm no expert, just a man with a calculator, but I'll take a stab. A. Do the multiplication - each share class only accounts for about half the market cap, so

I'm no expert, just a man with a calculator, but I'll take a stab. A. Do the multiplication - each share class only accounts for about half the market cap, so presumably Google Finance (or its source) knows that GOOG and GOOGL are the same company and sums them. I don't know why Z/ZG don't have the same property, though. B. I don't think the per-share spread is particularly illuminating here, because the distribution of outstanding shares between voting and nonvoting is different for each company (if there are relatively few voting shares, then I would expect the per-share spread to be higher proportionally, since each vote is more valuable). I'd be more interested in the total price of all votes - calculated as: (((price per voting share) - (price per non-voting share)) * (# of voting shares)) as a percentage of overall market cap: Google: $6.8B / $565.7B = 1.2% Zillow: $23.3M / $6.59B = 0.35% so I'd say investors actually value voting in Google at about 3.5x their vote in Zillow, proportional to overall company value. I'd be somewhat interested to see if this metric correlates with things like P/E ratio (e.g., are investors more or less interested in voting rights in fast-growing companies?), founder share status (e.g., does a high Google vote price mean that investors think the founders are more likely to cede their majority stake?), etc., or if it's just a case-by-case thing (e.g., due to liquidity issues like the other response talked about with CMG). C. That number should be "only" about 6.8B (per-share premium * number of shares of GOOGL); parent's calculation roughly double-counts the value of the vote (not exactly double since there are more shares of GOOG than GOOGL). Total control over Google would be immensely valuable - worth much, much more than $7B - so presumably the difference that large investors are willing to pay is based on a probability distribution of how many shares one would expect to need to control to have any influence on the board, weighted by what that influence would actually be worth (presumably fairly little, since Page/Brin/Schmidt hold a controlling majority of votes). The marginal value per vote is also different depending on how many you have - for an average investor, it's probably zero; for the institution trying to muscle its way onto the board, it's probably much more than $26/vote. D. This reads like a college essay question, and I feel like you have an answer in mind, but it's not immediately obvious to me what the two have to do with each other.