3 ms·

bets 1 million dollars on policy "transfer 2 million dollars to me" and causes that policy to be enacted, they lose money on their bets but still make out like

bets 1 million dollars on policy "transfer 2 million dollars to me" and causes that policy to be enacted, they lose money on their bets but still make out like a bandit. This glosses over the difference between prediction markets (markets for bets on outcomes) and futarchy (voting on results we want and automatically enacting the policies prediction markets endorse to achieve those results). Also, wouldn't a market thin enough to be gamed by interested parties attract investors like a stock trading at less than 1x earnings?

yummyfajitas 16y ago
It's very true that irrational bettors actually attract speculators (who are able to take their money). So it might be the case that interested parties can't push decision markets too far. I.e., the cost of influencing "policy give me 2 million bucks" might be 3 million dollars. Robin Hanson certainly believes this is true, but Mencius Moldbug believes he has found a real world case where it isn't. I don't understand the issue well enough to offer an informed opinion. http://unqualified-reservations.blogspot.com/2010/02/pipe-shorting-and-professor-hansons.html http://unqualified-reservations.blogspot.com/2010/02/pipe-sh...