6 ms·
I would ask: if DV is an acceptable weaker alternative to EV then why do we need certificates at all? Why doesn't anyone allow HTTPS without a certificate- it
by jmount 10y ago
I would ask: if DV is an acceptable weaker alternative to EV then why do we need certificates at all? Why doesn't anyone allow HTTPS without a certificate- it would allow you to establish you are talking to the same server you thought you were 5 seconds ago. The reason, of course, is: that certificate-less HTTPS and DV are pretty much useless and huge net-negatives as they are confusing and imitate stronger certifications.
- eridius 10y agoWhy is DV useless? DV asserts that you are securely talking to whomever controls that domain. That's very valuable. If they're confusing, that's on the browsers. Edit: You also cannot just discard certificates and use HTTPS as an "I'm talking to the same server I was 5 seconds ago", because that does literally nothing to prevent MitM attacks. If you can't assert that you're talking securely to the domain owner, then there's nothing at all stopping someone in a privileged network position from intercepting and altering your traffic, because they could simply proxy it through their own server.
- BoorishBears 10y agoI think the parent post is saying that you'd know that you're talking to the "same server" in a very literal sense (ie. if you were MITM'd, you'd know you're talking to the same server that MITM'd you the entire session). Not exactly sure what that'd buy...
- dTal 10y agoThis is the same argument as "self-signed certificates are useless". They aren't. Not all interception is MitM. With spy agencies operating passive taps on infrastructure, as a fraction of your intercepted traffic, virtually none of it us. Completely unsigned, unverified encryption is still a massive roadblock to dragnet surveillance. >does literally nothing to prevent MitM attacks It does more than nothing. Especially if you make the reasonable assumptions that 1) the user is not being MitMed most of the time and 2) the user is likely to have connected to the (small) set of sensitive sites before they experience their first MitM. Example: my home internet is unadulterated. I check my mail. My computer saves the certificate. I go to a coffee shop. I check my mail again. Somone tries to MitM me. My computer instantly spots a changed certificate. Obviously we should still use and verify certificates. But I notice a nasty trend of making the perfect the enemy of the good in security. There's a perception that if it's not perfect, it's worse than useless and should be shunned (probably due to historical bad experiences with false senses of security).
- eridius 10y agoYour computer can't simply remember the certificate that was used for the last connection, because then sites can never change their certificates (which would be a huge issue).
- dijit 10y agoMoxie mentioned before that using notaries would work, of course you have to worry about notaries being compromised but that's a much easier threat model. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL)
- wtbob 10y agoThey could, for example, sign the new cert with the old one.
- willstrafach 10y agoWhat if the certificate's private key is compromised? How would revocation work?
- SomeStupidPoint 10y agoWouldn't DV validate that your DNS resolved correctly, which non-certificate methods dont?
- gcp 10y agoNot only that, it also guarantees there's no MITM. HTTPS without certs means you are talking securely to your attacker :-)
- tremon 10y agoIt doesn't guarantee that, not without an explicit out-of-band certificate statement such as DANE. It only guarantees that the MitM you're talking to has gone through the additional trouble of getting an "official" certificate for the site you're trying to connect to.
- gcp 10y agoGetting this "official" certificate is in principle impossible. Of course, in practice sometimes it is possible, but so would reasonably be attacks against DANE (if anyone were using it).
- skybrian 10y agoWe need certificates because network traffic can be redirected. For example, once you've saved a bookmark to https://example.com https://example.com, the certificate ensures that clicking on the link connects you to a server that has the private key for example.com. That's worth something. But as the article points out, it doesn't help if you started out with the wrong domain name. (How do you get the bookmark in the first place?)
- Buge 10y agoDV is better than no certificate because it guarantees no one is MITMing just you. It could hypothetically be possible an attacker MITMed both the CA and you, but that's quite hard. EV has the security benefit over DV in that you can use HPKP to pin EV CA public keys, so no DV certificates will ever be trusted for your site.
- willstrafach 10y ago> It could hypothetically be possible an attacker MITMed both the CA and you, but that's quite hard. This statement does not make sense. Could you explain what you are implying here?
- pfg 10y agoI assume what's meant is that the CA could be MitM'd during the domain ownership verification process, thus issuing a certificate for the attacker, which the attacker can then use to MitM you. Presumably, MitM'ing the CA's traffic to the domain owner is significantly harder than MitM'ing a random user, though certainly not impossible.
- willstrafach 10y agoI do not see how that would be possible.
- pfg 10y agoAnything from cache poisoning of the CA's DNS server, BGP hijacking or pwning any network hop between the CA and the victim would be sufficient. Domain validation is nothing but a DNS query or a HTTP request.