4 ms·

This is what security looks like when your threat model is well funded government agencies.

dx034 10y ago
Exactly, and I think it's worth noting that they likely only apply this level of security because of state actors. Which then shows that they are trying to prevent eavesdropping by NSA & Co., they probably just realized too late how far advanced they were.
- DannyB2 10y ago
  . . . how far advanced, and the lengths they would go to.
- nickik 10y ago
  Eric Grosse from Google says as much here, ... Edit, it seems I have copied the wrong video, please us the link in the child comment
  - prattmic 10y ago
    This talk is also discusses the adversaries: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0knR6vXba7g https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0knR6vXba7g
- a_imho 10y ago
  Which then shows that they are trying to prevent eavesdropping by NSA & Co. Why would the NSA eavesdrop on Google, they are in bed with them, aren't they?
  - kakarot 10y ago
    Got links?
    - a_imho 10y ago
      For me, the whole takeaway of the Snowden leaks was that the NSA can legally force Google (or anyone) to hand over basically anything, am I mistaken? Articles like [1] seems to underline they are indeed working together. [1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/06/nsa-google_n_5273437.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/06/nsa-google_n_527343...
      - kakarot 10y ago
        An abusive, rapey relationship is not the same thing as being "in bed".
        a_imho 10y ago
        That link is anything but an abusive relationship. Still, I fail to see how silicone is a countermeasure to a court order.
        rl3 10y ago
        When Google has its networks compromised and is routinely compelled to comply with NSLs, I'd say that counts as abusive.
      - Pyxl101 10y ago
        The Snowden disclosures did not suggest that Internet companies like Google were coordinating with NSA. The disclosures suggested that NSA was wiretapping all traffic across the Internet, and then parsing it, storing it, and indexing it so as to be able to make sense of what traffic represented e.g. a Google web search, and then search that semantically later. Because at the time Google did not use encryption in their network links between data centers, NSA was able to siphon up a whole lot of information that way - maybe more than just interaction between users and Google services, potentially as much as interaction between internal components of Google. Anyway, Google and other companies responded by employing encryption in these links, and promoting the use of encryption across a number of other protocols. The Snowden disclosures were in my perspective a catalyst for Google's promotion of HTTPS in the Chrome browser, and TLS in Gmail, and probably Certificate Transparency. The fact that these initiatives such as encryption between data centers started after the disclosures suggests that they were a response from Google to thwart this kind of surveillance.
  - euyyn 10y ago
    Snowden revealed the opposite: https://cdn.grahamcluley.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/nsa-postit.jpeg https://cdn.grahamcluley.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/nsa-... NSA actively tries to eavesdrop on Google.
    - dx034 10y ago
      And the chips are probably the reaction to exactly that slide. Not only enabling SSL between datacentres, but verifying all code that servers run, to avoid that the NSA can download private keys from Google servers just because they handed an ESL to the datacentre operator. Of course they can still use courts to get data directly from Google, but that way they can always only target individuals or small groups, not whole nations.
nickpsecurity 10y ago
Same threat model with black hats. Here's a recent example from high-security field that's remarkably simple but stops tons of attacks: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/grads/c/csong43/oakland16-hdfi.pdf http://www.cc.gatech.edu/grads/c/csong43/oakland16-hdfi.pdf Its related work & extension page has a ton of references to other things showing just how much work it is to stop regular black hats in systems without verified software. Nation states just do more of the same stuff. Edmison's has a nice survey & design for when you don't trust anything outside the SOC: https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-204811/unrestricted/edmison_joshua_dissertation.pdf https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-2048... NSA targets those levels, too. At that point, your bases are covered so long as the fab receives and doesn't alter your design. Plus the complex tooling works...

dx034 10y ago

Exactly, and I think it's worth noting that they likely only apply this level of security because of state actors. Which then shows that they are trying to prevent eavesdropping by NSA & Co., they probably just realized too late how far advanced they were.

DannyB2 10y ago
. . . how far advanced, and the lengths they would go to.
nickik 10y ago
Eric Grosse from Google says as much here, ... Edit, it seems I have copied the wrong video, please us the link in the child comment
- prattmic 10y ago
  This talk is also discusses the adversaries: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0knR6vXba7g https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0knR6vXba7g
a_imho 10y ago
Which then shows that they are trying to prevent eavesdropping by NSA & Co. Why would the NSA eavesdrop on Google, they are in bed with them, aren't they?
- kakarot 10y ago
  Got links?
  - a_imho 10y ago
    For me, the whole takeaway of the Snowden leaks was that the NSA can legally force Google (or anyone) to hand over basically anything, am I mistaken? Articles like [1] seems to underline they are indeed working together. [1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/06/nsa-google_n_5273437.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/06/nsa-google_n_527343...
    - kakarot 10y ago
      An abusive, rapey relationship is not the same thing as being "in bed".
      - a_imho 10y ago
        That link is anything but an abusive relationship. Still, I fail to see how silicone is a countermeasure to a court order.
        rl3 10y ago
        When Google has its networks compromised and is routinely compelled to comply with NSLs, I'd say that counts as abusive.
    - Pyxl101 10y ago
      The Snowden disclosures did not suggest that Internet companies like Google were coordinating with NSA. The disclosures suggested that NSA was wiretapping all traffic across the Internet, and then parsing it, storing it, and indexing it so as to be able to make sense of what traffic represented e.g. a Google web search, and then search that semantically later. Because at the time Google did not use encryption in their network links between data centers, NSA was able to siphon up a whole lot of information that way - maybe more than just interaction between users and Google services, potentially as much as interaction between internal components of Google. Anyway, Google and other companies responded by employing encryption in these links, and promoting the use of encryption across a number of other protocols. The Snowden disclosures were in my perspective a catalyst for Google's promotion of HTTPS in the Chrome browser, and TLS in Gmail, and probably Certificate Transparency. The fact that these initiatives such as encryption between data centers started after the disclosures suggests that they were a response from Google to thwart this kind of surveillance.
- euyyn 10y ago
  Snowden revealed the opposite: https://cdn.grahamcluley.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/nsa-postit.jpeg https://cdn.grahamcluley.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/nsa-... NSA actively tries to eavesdrop on Google.
  - dx034 10y ago
    And the chips are probably the reaction to exactly that slide. Not only enabling SSL between datacentres, but verifying all code that servers run, to avoid that the NSA can download private keys from Google servers just because they handed an ESL to the datacentre operator. Of course they can still use courts to get data directly from Google, but that way they can always only target individuals or small groups, not whole nations.

nickpsecurity 10y ago

Same threat model with black hats. Here's a recent example from high-security field that's remarkably simple but stops tons of attacks: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/grads/c/csong43/oakland16-hdfi.pdf http://www.cc.gatech.edu/grads/c/csong43/oakland16-hdfi.pdf Its related work & extension page has a ton of references to other things showing just how much work it is to stop regular black hats in systems without verified software. Nation states just do more of the same stuff. Edmison's has a nice survey & design for when you don't trust anything outside the SOC: https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-204811/unrestricted/edmison_joshua_dissertation.pdf https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-2048... NSA targets those levels, too. At that point, your bases are covered so long as the fab receives and doesn't alter your design. Plus the complex tooling works...