5 ms·
>the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't. How would that be worse than the current situation, whe
by whyoh 10y ago
>the (potentially compromised) server would know who has enabled notifications/blocking and who hasn't.
How would that be worse than the current situation, where everyone is vulnerable and we all know it?
- FabHK 10y agoFrom Moxie's response in another thread: [...] a fact of life is that the majority of users will probably not verify keys. That is our reality. Given that reality, the most important thing is to design your product so that the server has no knowledge of who has verified keys or who has enabled a setting to see key change notifications. That way the server has no knowledge of who it can MITM without getting caught. I've been impressed with the level of care that WhatsApp has given to that requirement. I think we should all remain open to ideas about how we can improve this UX within the limits a mass market product has to operate within, but that's very different from labeling this a "backdoor." https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13394900
- FabHK 10y agoAs a counterpoint, though, see the discoverer of the vulnerability: "As Eike Kühl pretty well describes, this functionality only increases usability in a rare corner case: When you dump your phone in the ocean and you need a month to get a new one. Then everyone who has sent you a message during this period will not need to press an additional "OK" button." https://tobi.rocks/2017/01/what-is-facebook-going-to-do-a-suggestion/ https://tobi.rocks/2017/01/what-is-facebook-going-to-do-a-su...