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That is a very loaded question. It may be easier to understand "what is going on" broadly if you try to frame it in terms of actions: What can you do about this

by geocar 10y ago

That is a very loaded question. It may be easier to understand "what is going on" broadly if you try to frame it in terms of actions: What can you do about this? What do you want to do about this? The "backdoor" (insecurity) is that Facebook can read and spoof your WhatsApp messages, and can be compelled to by any government of a country in which they operate, or by any determined attacker. This surprises people because they believe WhatsApp is secure, since Facebook said so, and because it ostensibly obtains that security from someone who is endorsed by someone else who is considered knowledgable about security. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11431728 However it is (in this case) insecure because of a "user-interface issue" (whatever Moxie means by that). Basically, the key and software can be changed at any time, and if it is changed (because of a cloned phone, or with FaceBook's help, or with Google/Apple's help, or because someone hacks some FaceBook/Apple/Google servers, or for other reasons). Moxie intimates that this shouldn't be called a "backdoor" because it wasn't put in with malice, even if it was put in intentionally. Do you agree with that? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13396129 Now what do you want to do? Do you want to get some pitchforks and find someone to stab? Do you want to stop using WhatsApp and convince other people to do so as well? Do you want to learn more about security and how cryptography works? Right now, we are looking some kind of campaign- perhaps it is organised and malicious, or perhaps we are seeing multiple actors who have multiple ways of benefitting so they only appear coordinated. That is, are you making this decision yourself? Or are you being encouraged down a path that supports someone elses' goals? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they like chaos and carnage and hope that by being doomsayers they will get you to watch their video/read their blog and earn money from advertising? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they think we (society) need to actually demand real security and privacy? Should we ask a private company to respect our security and privacy wishes? Or should we ask our government (which is us)? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because they have a competitors' product? Is there another popular "secure messaging" product for mobile devices that does not have these problems? Do these actors want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal because these tools are actually quite secure and problematic, and it would be more convenient if people who wanted privacy and security could be more easily investigated covertly? Is this a "false flag" on privacy launched perhaps by a state actor? Are there other reasons actors would want to impeach FaceBook/Whatsapp/Signal? What is going on "exactly" has questions and answers on so many levels it is difficult to know where to begin, but I have popcorn.

FabHK 10y ago
> Facebook can read and spoof your WhatsApp messages a) only those that have not been delivered yet b) you can notice, having enabled the security notifications in the app, by noticing the notice and then verifying key fingerprints again
- geocar 10y ago
  Since the software can be updated at almost any time, I don't think either of those are true.
  - FabHK 10y ago
    If the client gets compromised, you're screwed anyway. e2e encryption's goal is that the communication between A and B is secure even if the server gets compromised. Here, by design choice, the server could be compromised such that messages that (A thinks) B hasn't received yet can be triggered (by the server) to be re-keyed and re-sent from A.
    - geocar 10y ago
      I don't think this is what most people think of when they think of "e2e encryption". If "A" is FaceBook software (client) and the communication to FaceBook's servers is encrypted, that should be standard, but it's not "e2e encryption". That's what TLS/SSL does. Why do we need another protocol when we already have TLS/SSL? Those are hugely deployed protocols whose implementations still have bugs. I think "A" is me. I think that's what most people think, that we're talking about keeping the communication private between them and their partner. "A" is not the software that FaceBook controls: If FaceBook cannot decrypt my messages, then nobody can hack FaceBook to decrypt my messages, and FaceBook cannot be compelled to provide my messages to someone else. That's something that is actually valuable, and befitting a special label of "e2e encryption". FaceBook can update that software (so can Google, Apple, or potentially Amazon or any other "app store" in the ideal scenario, hackers in the less ideal, and an oppressive government in the dire) at any time, so you simply do not know what it does, did, or will do, but at least you can keep it honest if you can supply and verify the keys yourself.

by geocar 10y ago

FabHK 10y ago

> Facebook can read and spoof your WhatsApp messages a) only those that have not been delivered yet b) you can notice, having enabled the security notifications in the app, by noticing the notice and then verifying key fingerprints again

geocar 10y ago
Since the software can be updated at almost any time, I don't think either of those are true.
- FabHK 10y ago
  If the client gets compromised, you're screwed anyway. e2e encryption's goal is that the communication between A and B is secure even if the server gets compromised. Here, by design choice, the server could be compromised such that messages that (A thinks) B hasn't received yet can be triggered (by the server) to be re-keyed and re-sent from A.
  - geocar 10y ago
    I don't think this is what most people think of when they think of "e2e encryption". If "A" is FaceBook software (client) and the communication to FaceBook's servers is encrypted, that should be standard, but it's not "e2e encryption". That's what TLS/SSL does. Why do we need another protocol when we already have TLS/SSL? Those are hugely deployed protocols whose implementations still have bugs. I think "A" is me. I think that's what most people think, that we're talking about keeping the communication private between them and their partner. "A" is not the software that FaceBook controls: If FaceBook cannot decrypt my messages, then nobody can hack FaceBook to decrypt my messages, and FaceBook cannot be compelled to provide my messages to someone else. That's something that is actually valuable, and befitting a special label of "e2e encryption". FaceBook can update that software (so can Google, Apple, or potentially Amazon or any other "app store" in the ideal scenario, hackers in the less ideal, and an oppressive government in the dire) at any time, so you simply do not know what it does, did, or will do, but at least you can keep it honest if you can supply and verify the keys yourself.