9 ms·
No it is a backdoor. Becuase the app fucks you on purpose, even if you go to great lenghts to verify the keys. Also the vulnerabilty matches perfectly one scen
by venomsnake 10y ago
No it is a backdoor. Becuase the app fucks you on purpose, even if you go to great lenghts to verify the keys.
Also the vulnerabilty matches perfectly one scenario - when a person is in custody, the LEO cannot open its phone, but they can create account on new device with his sim card and continue "trusted" chats.
- Eyas 10y agoI understand why that is a concern for the security conscious. But for the 90% use case, e.g.: I lost my phone and got a new one. Or my phone isn't turning on and I get a new one. I install WhatsApp. How do I roll over my identity? The way I see it is that WhatsApp is delegating the task of identity verification to the network provider (admittedly a weak link for the security conscious). But it _is_ the easiest way for the average user to continue chats on a new phone. If the default setting were reversed, HN would stop complaining, but the 90% would. The most 'secure' means of communication is probably a one-time pad communicated via paper on magic ink that you then burn, or something. There is a cost to ease of use in many cases. I wish the conversation was less about right v wrong, and more about what tradeoffs should be made and where to draw the line.
- rocqua 10y agoThe nice solution here that would please security-conscious people with an opt-in would be for that opt-in to prevent automatic re-encryption and re-transmission under the new key. To expand on the example given above, if the police get your phone, turn it off and wait for a while. You might have quite a few incoming unreceived messages. They can then simply take the sim, put it in a new phone, and register that with whatsapp. They can then read all messages sent to you since they turned of your phone.