4 ms·
Oh good, yet another vulnerability from the model of retroactively changing the execution environment of a process after it's been created. We had a thread abou
by geofft 10y ago
Oh good, yet another vulnerability from the model of retroactively changing the execution environment of a process after it's been created. We had a thread about setuid binaries a week ago, which is the most common case of this design: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13312722 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13312722
We would all be better off if we designed systems such that some helper process, already running with the right environment / config / privileges, spawns the process for you and proxies input/output to your terminal.
And (as I mentioned in the other thread) this helper process could be literally sshd. Instead of having sudo, ssh root@localhost. No weird process trees with confusing things like effective UIDs. Instead of having runc exec, ssh root@container. No file descriptors get passed that aren't explicitly forwarded over the SSH connection.
Patching sshd to run over UNIX sockets without encryption and to use getpeername() for authentication is left as an exercise to the reader.
- jasonjayr 10y agoNo patches nessecary :) I use this quite successfully in my ~/.ssh/config currently. With some options baked on, You probably could disable encryption too: Host web LogLevel QUIET ForwardAgent yes ProxyCommand setsid lxc-attach -q -n web01 --clear-env -- /usr/sbin/sshd -i
- geofft 10y agoHah, that is so close to the design I'm advocating, except that lxc-attach is yet another command in the mold of runc exec or sudo :-) That design certainly lets lxc-attach permit only running sshd, though, which is a benefit. (And I forgot about sshd -i, which you could presumably point at a UNIX socket using socat or something.)
- justincormack 10y agoThe Go ssh library works fine over unix sockets, and you can easily customise auth, so it is pretty easy to make quick custom clients and servers with it.
- mnarayan01 10y agoHow would you implement e.g. ping? I mean obviously you could have e.g. user accounts which were "sufficiently" locked down, but that seems like an even more likely source of problems.
- justincormack 10y agoLinux supports non privileged ping. socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM IPPROTO_ICMP); (it needs a sysctl config to enable it, annoyingly)
- geofft 10y agoThree options: 1. ping hasn't needed to be setuid since Linux 3.0 (and isn't on most distros), the kernel lets you call socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP) without privileges, which lets you send ping packets and nothing else. Looks like Mac OS X and FreeBSD, at least, also support the same interface. This approach has successfully been used to eliminate other setuid binaries like pt_chown, which fixes ownership of a tty (the kernel now just sets the ownership correctly when you call open). 2. Use something like ForceCommand to allow "ssh root@localhost /sbin/ping", and make /bin/ping a shell script that does that. This carries strictly less complexity than making a setuid binary; any attack that applies to it also applies to setuid binaries, but the execution environment for setuid binaries is more open to the attacker's control. 3. Make a little ping server that you can request to conduct pings for you. For ping in particular this is probably silly, but for things like updating utmp (traditionally you make every program setgid utmp, or you use a helper setgid binary called utempter), there's probably some existing daemon like logind that can grow some small APIs.
- aaronmdjones 10y agoAlong with the aforementioned IPPROTO_ICMP; you can still use file capabilities(7) instead (or as well, in the case of older kernels): # chmod 0711 /bin/ping # setcap CAP_NET_RAW=eip /bin/ping
- geofft 10y agoFile capabilities are certainly better than setuid, but they still have the same problem of elevating privileges in a potentially-attacker-controlled environment. If setuid ping has a vulnerability that lets you get root, CAP_NET_RAW ping would also have a vulnerability that lets you read all traffic into the machine and spoof packets from privileged ports or existing connections. That's an uncomfortably large amount of access, even if it isn't quite root.
- zokier 10y agoI think that is closer to how you do things in Windows, first set up the process environment and finally call CreateProcess or something like that. Maybe someone who knows Win32/NT internals better could comment?
- stormbrew 10y agoI've often wondered what it would take to have a linux environment with setuid completely turned off, and this is actually a really interesting thought on how to achieve part of that. Nice. :)