4 ms·
> What's more, the reference implementations of these algorithms also come from Dan Bernstein (again with help from others), leading to a never-before-seen cryp
by theandrewbailey 10y ago
> What's more, the reference implementations of these algorithms also come from Dan Bernstein (again with help from others), leading to a never-before-seen crypto monoculture in which it's possible that the entire algorithm suite used by a security protocol, and the entire implementation of that suite, all originate from one person.
We've had crypto monoculture before. 15-20 years ago, we were using RSA, RC4, and MD5. Ron Rivest had a large hand in all of them. They weren't bad for the time, and the bad parts weren't bad because of common authorship.
- JamesLeonis 10y agoI think the problem is ultimately the Bus Factor. If we're all relying on one implementation and that implementation is compromised (hit by a bus, a bug, NSA involvement, one bad 0-day, etc), there isn't anything to fall back on. That's my take given the history provided. This may be fixed as time passes and more implementations and crypto experts come together, but it does leave us with a Single Point of Failure nonetheless at this time.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoWhen a crypto primitive breaks (like MD5 did), we're kinda screwed anyway. On the other hand, bug-free implementations are possible. We have the tools to audit the hell out of them. That kind of pedestrian can be made immune to buses, so to speak.
- tptacek 10y agoLet's not forget that the designer of Rijndael (AES) is also the designer of Keccak (SHA-3). RC4, by the way, was bad even for the time. It would be worth studying how it managed to survive as long as it did, because flaws in RC4 were well known long before the browser drama.
- rockdoe 10y agoIn the case of SHA-3 it's particularly ironic that the desire to avoid a monoculture in designs led to a monoculture in designers. (The authors of AES had one of the few submissions that was very different from AES and this was a large factor in it getting picked)
- caf 10y agoIt'd guess it was a combination of not being patented (they tried to protect it as a trade secret instead but it leaked), the general ease-of-application of stream ciphers, and the fact that RC4 in particular is so easy to implement you can easily memorise and bash it out in a few minutes.
- aidenn0 10y agoRC4 was a state of the art stream cipher in 1987; that it took so long for a practical attack to appear, despite its wide use, is a testament to the fact that it was clearly not "bad even for the time"
- tptacek 10y agoRC4 was a trade secret unknown to the rest of the industry until it was leaked on Usenet in the mid-90a.