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Sorry but you still haven't substantiated your argument with any such "proof". It looks like you also made a "prediction" about what's going to be decided by p
by zx2c4 10y ago
Sorry but you still haven't substantiated your argument with any such "proof".
It looks like you also made a "prediction" about what's going to be decided by people who certainly aren't you in the future.
Got a cryptographically secure PRF that's faster than Siphash for small inputs and has undergone extensive cryptanalysis? If so, I'm all ears. If not, get lost, troll.
There's a real use case for a secure PRF fast for small inputs. That's why this code has been added.
- rurban 10y agoYou are the troll when you dont see the obvious proofs. 1. DOS proof: a hash function can never lead to DoS proofness. Every hash function can be trivially brute forced to find enough collisions for such an attack. When you need to protect against such a worst case you don't make your hash function slower and get limited seed hiding, you rather check for such an attack and mitigate it directly, at the collision resolution. 2. Slowness: see my smhasher page. The slowest of all hash functions which is used in hash tables. I don't see a usecase for a slow PRF in net. All other PRF's are faster. I also don't see more security, only less. SHA1 replaced by SipHash surely makes it faster, but not safer.