> I see no reason to assume evidence that would implicate Russia must be so sensitive that the government would never divulge it. This is the source and method

> I see no reason to assume evidence that would implicate Russia must be so sensitive that the government would never divulge it. This is the source and methods (or what I like to call S&M) debate. Let's say your nephew wants to come out as gay. He tells only his mother. His mother tells you. Now you write on Facebook, "I just learned my nephew is gay. He will always be my nephew and I love him and his courage." Now your nephew knows his mom (your sister) blabbed. This could have a ton of effects on your intelligence gathering network. For example, your sister might not want to tell you anything anymore. You just lost a source. Your nephew, feeling betrayed, might cut his mother out of his life. You just burned a source. These are situations where even revealing judgments could lose sources. In situations where there are multiple sources, it becomes somewhat more difficult for your target to identify the leak, which gives you a larger safety margin. So the question the intelligence agencies and the administration had to answer with this report is, "Are these judgments worth burning sources? If we reveal specific pieces of evidence, which are highly traceable to the original leak, can those sources be burned?" Clearly, they made a call that you found unsatisfactory. But I hope you understand why they made that call.