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The details about the zeroes: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-us-nukes-was-00000000-for-20-years/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy

by acqq 10y ago

The details about the zeroes: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-us-nukes-was-00000000-for-20-years/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-u... "Launch code for US nukes was 00000000 for 20 years" http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuke-launch-code-was-never-00000000/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuk... So it was not actually eight zeros (or four) but apparently 6 zeroes (000000) and effectively the "key under the doormat" (in the safe with the key in the same base as the rocket, the opposite of what was claimed then). The procedure was more complex than just keying in zeroes, but everything was surely trained on the rehearsals. Now, imagine somebody just and only once forgets to apply the "it's just a rehearsal" command. What's the "acceptable" probability some city being successfully targeted, even only and just once, especially knowing that it can trigger the retaliation? The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists.

Jarwain 10y ago
>The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. Isn't the idea behind Mutually Assured Destruction not some ego battle, but a deterrent? If nuking another country definitely results in one's own country being nuked, that provides a clear incentive towards self-preservation and not nuking that country in the first place.
kevin_nisbet 10y ago
It's actually very interesting. I don't remember if it was from Command and Control, or somewhere else, that I once read a story along the lines of. When the missile launch crews, routinely were tested. And something along the lines of a set of codes was used for a test launch. And a different set of codes was used for a real launch. On one of these tests, the real launch codes were used by mistake. But due to the crew asking for confirmation several times, the person eventually noticed their mistake and cancelled the order. But if I understand/remember correctly, strictly speaking these crews were given a valid launch command. While I didn't find my source for that particular example, I do believe it does happen where training and real have gotten mixed up. The most famous of which, is I think when the operator used a training tape in the early warning system, which caused the US to think they were under attack. https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-have-been/ https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-h...
LeifCarrotson 10y ago
> The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. The semi-automated response is a good thing, it makes your commitment to retaliate even more certain. This is because the enemy is typically expected to be aware of your capability, rational, and selfish. If they know that you won't fire the rockets back in response, they CAN win, and they might use their weapons. If they won't win, they won't fire the rockets in the first place. Now, to be precise, the important part of the scheme is only that the enemy thinks you will fire the rocket. After the rockets are launched towards you, it doesn't matter anymore, and yes, you could (and should) nobly self-sacrifice your nation so that humanity survives. But any suggestion or expectation that this will happen makes it more likely that the enemy will call your bluff and destroy you. Honestly, with this logic in consideration, it makes me wonder if some of the rumors and leaks about how close we have been to launching counterattacks are fabricated. Though given the risk of espionage, it's probably safer to simply not bluff. All this falls apart if the enemy is either unaware of or disbelieving in your retaliation, so they might fire their missiles expecting you to not fire back. Or if they're irrational, failing to understand that they will not win. Or if they're not selfish (perhaps the scariest of the possibilities): Perhaps because they are suicidal, which could be considered a sub-class of irrational. Or because they think you will not retaliate against them, instead retaliating against someone else: For example, if through subterfuge the US could fire Pakistani missiles at North Korea, not being dissuaded by North Korea's retaliation against Pakistan because the destruction would be on a different continent, or for example the military or political leadership initiating the attack are in another country, or better yet, on another planet) and not personally harmed by their own country being destroyed. I completely agree that the world would be a safer place if these weapons did not exist. Unfortunately, they do, and we're neither able to modify physics so that they don't, nor to unanimously agree that no use them, so we're stuck with this sub-optimal equilibrium.
gozur88 10y ago
>The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" That's not at all true. The logic of nuclear war is that your enemy must believe with a high degree of certainty that you will launch if attacked. Whether you actually do or not is beside the point.
akiselev 10y ago
I keep reading that the launch codes were set to zeroes in news articles but every technical document I read says the code was only used in Permissive Action Link devices. As I understand it, these PALs were mechanisms that prevented the nuclear weapon from arming so even if the code was accidentally put into the weapon it wouldn't actually detonate until the ICBM launch sequence was initiated (by a separate process) and the warhead detonation mechanism fired. They are a safety feature that was added on to nuclear weapons starting in the late 50's, not some sort of detonation or launch control system. That said, the PALs weren't fitted to the entire US arsenal until the late 80's so lots of nukes had mechanical keys for decades. Hopefully they took the rehearsal part more seriously than the security of the arsenal...

by acqq 10y ago

Jarwain 10y ago

kevin_nisbet 10y ago

It's actually very interesting. I don't remember if it was from Command and Control, or somewhere else, that I once read a story along the lines of. When the missile launch crews, routinely were tested. And something along the lines of a set of codes was used for a test launch. And a different set of codes was used for a real launch. On one of these tests, the real launch codes were used by mistake. But due to the crew asking for confirmation several times, the person eventually noticed their mistake and cancelled the order. But if I understand/remember correctly, strictly speaking these crews were given a valid launch command. While I didn't find my source for that particular example, I do believe it does happen where training and real have gotten mixed up. The most famous of which, is I think when the operator used a training tape in the early warning system, which caused the US to think they were under attack. https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-have-been/ https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-h...

LeifCarrotson 10y ago

> The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. The semi-automated response is a good thing, it makes your commitment to retaliate even more certain. This is because the enemy is typically expected to be aware of your capability, rational, and selfish. If they know that you won't fire the rockets back in response, they CAN win, and they might use their weapons. If they won't win, they won't fire the rockets in the first place. Now, to be precise, the important part of the scheme is only that the enemy thinks you will fire the rocket. After the rockets are launched towards you, it doesn't matter anymore, and yes, you could (and should) nobly self-sacrifice your nation so that humanity survives. But any suggestion or expectation that this will happen makes it more likely that the enemy will call your bluff and destroy you. Honestly, with this logic in consideration, it makes me wonder if some of the rumors and leaks about how close we have been to launching counterattacks are fabricated. Though given the risk of espionage, it's probably safer to simply not bluff. All this falls apart if the enemy is either unaware of or disbelieving in your retaliation, so they might fire their missiles expecting you to not fire back. Or if they're irrational, failing to understand that they will not win. Or if they're not selfish (perhaps the scariest of the possibilities): Perhaps because they are suicidal, which could be considered a sub-class of irrational. Or because they think you will not retaliate against them, instead retaliating against someone else: For example, if through subterfuge the US could fire Pakistani missiles at North Korea, not being dissuaded by North Korea's retaliation against Pakistan because the destruction would be on a different continent, or for example the military or political leadership initiating the attack are in another country, or better yet, on another planet) and not personally harmed by their own country being destroyed. I completely agree that the world would be a safer place if these weapons did not exist. Unfortunately, they do, and we're neither able to modify physics so that they don't, nor to unanimously agree that no use them, so we're stuck with this sub-optimal equilibrium.

gozur88 10y ago

>The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" That's not at all true. The logic of nuclear war is that your enemy must believe with a high degree of certainty that you will launch if attacked. Whether you actually do or not is beside the point.

akiselev 10y ago

I keep reading that the launch codes were set to zeroes in news articles but every technical document I read says the code was only used in Permissive Action Link devices. As I understand it, these PALs were mechanisms that prevented the nuclear weapon from arming so even if the code was accidentally put into the weapon it wouldn't actually detonate until the ICBM launch sequence was initiated (by a separate process) and the warhead detonation mechanism fired. They are a safety feature that was added on to nuclear weapons starting in the late 50's, not some sort of detonation or launch control system. That said, the PALs weren't fitted to the entire US arsenal until the late 80's so lots of nukes had mechanical keys for decades. Hopefully they took the rehearsal part more seriously than the security of the arsenal...