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I'm not sure that I entirely agree with this assessment. One of the very interesting things I got out of reading Command And Control by Eric Schlosser, was the

I'm not sure that I entirely agree with this assessment. One of the very interesting things I got out of reading Command And Control by Eric Schlosser, was the number of very severe accidents that have happened in the US in the handling of nuclear weapons. While probably somewhat overstated, to me it basically makes a case that the US is lucky it hasn't nuked itself by accident (and some of the stories told in that book are incredible, I enjoyed that book). Also, some of the stories make the case about how abysmal the care and prudence was around handling these weapons, such as the reluctance for years to even put codes on the weapons, or when they were forced to, setting every code to 0000. While I do believe the attitude may have changed, I don't know that it's prudent to put unwavering faith into the people handling these arms, based on what's told in this book. While I don't want to say you suffer from this, I've seen what I believe to be a miss-allocation of risk in some of the engineering roles I've worked at. What I mean by this, is that because an event hasn't happened, or hasn't happened recently, that we believe the risk has changed. I've literally been part of a discussion on why do we need backups, because we've never restored from one. If I understand correctly, this was the sort of philosophy that led to the challenger explosion, we launched the rocket before and it didn't explode, so why would it happen this time. To me, this is a fallacy of risk, previous events or recent history don't change the risk. So while you're right, the risk that a nuclear accident happens, compared to a tornado or flooding happening is much different, doesn't mean that a nuclear accident won't happen. I also highly suspect, that if a nuclear armed country accidentally nukes itself, it would grip the world in a much different way than any tornado or flood. And may change your well-being in very dramatic way's, especially if one doesn't realize it was even an accident to begin with. edit: minor grammatical mistakes

caf 10y ago
Also recommended reading is The Dead Hand by David E Hoffman.
acqq 10y ago
The details about the zeroes: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-us-nukes-was-00000000-for-20-years/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-u... "Launch code for US nukes was 00000000 for 20 years" http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuke-launch-code-was-never-00000000/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuk... So it was not actually eight zeros (or four) but apparently 6 zeroes (000000) and effectively the "key under the doormat" (in the safe with the key in the same base as the rocket, the opposite of what was claimed then). The procedure was more complex than just keying in zeroes, but everything was surely trained on the rehearsals. Now, imagine somebody just and only once forgets to apply the "it's just a rehearsal" command. What's the "acceptable" probability some city being successfully targeted, even only and just once, especially knowing that it can trigger the retaliation? The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists.
- Jarwain 10y ago
  >The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. Isn't the idea behind Mutually Assured Destruction not some ego battle, but a deterrent? If nuking another country definitely results in one's own country being nuked, that provides a clear incentive towards self-preservation and not nuking that country in the first place.
- kevin_nisbet 10y ago
  It's actually very interesting. I don't remember if it was from Command and Control, or somewhere else, that I once read a story along the lines of. When the missile launch crews, routinely were tested. And something along the lines of a set of codes was used for a test launch. And a different set of codes was used for a real launch. On one of these tests, the real launch codes were used by mistake. But due to the crew asking for confirmation several times, the person eventually noticed their mistake and cancelled the order. But if I understand/remember correctly, strictly speaking these crews were given a valid launch command. While I didn't find my source for that particular example, I do believe it does happen where training and real have gotten mixed up. The most famous of which, is I think when the operator used a training tape in the early warning system, which caused the US to think they were under attack. https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-have-been/ https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-h...
- LeifCarrotson 10y ago
  > The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. The semi-automated response is a good thing, it makes your commitment to retaliate even more certain. This is because the enemy is typically expected to be aware of your capability, rational, and selfish. If they know that you won't fire the rockets back in response, they CAN win, and they might use their weapons. If they won't win, they won't fire the rockets in the first place. Now, to be precise, the important part of the scheme is only that the enemy thinks you will fire the rocket. After the rockets are launched towards you, it doesn't matter anymore, and yes, you could (and should) nobly self-sacrifice your nation so that humanity survives. But any suggestion or expectation that this will happen makes it more likely that the enemy will call your bluff and destroy you. Honestly, with this logic in consideration, it makes me wonder if some of the rumors and leaks about how close we have been to launching counterattacks are fabricated. Though given the risk of espionage, it's probably safer to simply not bluff. All this falls apart if the enemy is either unaware of or disbelieving in your retaliation, so they might fire their missiles expecting you to not fire back. Or if they're irrational, failing to understand that they will not win. Or if they're not selfish (perhaps the scariest of the possibilities): Perhaps because they are suicidal, which could be considered a sub-class of irrational. Or because they think you will not retaliate against them, instead retaliating against someone else: For example, if through subterfuge the US could fire Pakistani missiles at North Korea, not being dissuaded by North Korea's retaliation against Pakistan because the destruction would be on a different continent, or for example the military or political leadership initiating the attack are in another country, or better yet, on another planet) and not personally harmed by their own country being destroyed. I completely agree that the world would be a safer place if these weapons did not exist. Unfortunately, they do, and we're neither able to modify physics so that they don't, nor to unanimously agree that no use them, so we're stuck with this sub-optimal equilibrium.

caf 10y ago

Also recommended reading is The Dead Hand by David E Hoffman.

acqq 10y ago

The details about the zeroes: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-us-nukes-was-00000000-for-20-years/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-u... "Launch code for US nukes was 00000000 for 20 years" http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuke-launch-code-was-never-00000000/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/air-force-swears-our-nuk... So it was not actually eight zeros (or four) but apparently 6 zeroes (000000) and effectively the "key under the doormat" (in the safe with the key in the same base as the rocket, the opposite of what was claimed then). The procedure was more complex than just keying in zeroes, but everything was surely trained on the rehearsals. Now, imagine somebody just and only once forgets to apply the "it's just a rehearsal" command. What's the "acceptable" probability some city being successfully targeted, even only and just once, especially knowing that it can trigger the retaliation? The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists.

Jarwain 10y ago
>The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. Isn't the idea behind Mutually Assured Destruction not some ego battle, but a deterrent? If nuking another country definitely results in one's own country being nuked, that provides a clear incentive towards self-preservation and not nuking that country in the first place.
kevin_nisbet 10y ago
It's actually very interesting. I don't remember if it was from Command and Control, or somewhere else, that I once read a story along the lines of. When the missile launch crews, routinely were tested. And something along the lines of a set of codes was used for a test launch. And a different set of codes was used for a real launch. On one of these tests, the real launch codes were used by mistake. But due to the crew asking for confirmation several times, the person eventually noticed their mistake and cancelled the order. But if I understand/remember correctly, strictly speaking these crews were given a valid launch command. While I didn't find my source for that particular example, I do believe it does happen where training and real have gotten mixed up. The most famous of which, is I think when the operator used a training tape in the early warning system, which caused the US to think they were under attack. https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-have-been/ https://www.damninteresting.com/the-apocalypses-that-might-h...
LeifCarrotson 10y ago
> The logic of the nuclear war is: "if the rockets come to you, you have to send yours to them, because otherwise they won!" -- they think it's better that the civilization gets wiped out than to appear to be a "chicken." Even a kind of semi-automated response surely exists. The semi-automated response is a good thing, it makes your commitment to retaliate even more certain. This is because the enemy is typically expected to be aware of your capability, rational, and selfish. If they know that you won't fire the rockets back in response, they CAN win, and they might use their weapons. If they won't win, they won't fire the rockets in the first place. Now, to be precise, the important part of the scheme is only that the enemy thinks you will fire the rocket. After the rockets are launched towards you, it doesn't matter anymore, and yes, you could (and should) nobly self-sacrifice your nation so that humanity survives. But any suggestion or expectation that this will happen makes it more likely that the enemy will call your bluff and destroy you. Honestly, with this logic in consideration, it makes me wonder if some of the rumors and leaks about how close we have been to launching counterattacks are fabricated. Though given the risk of espionage, it's probably safer to simply not bluff. All this falls apart if the enemy is either unaware of or disbelieving in your retaliation, so they might fire their missiles expecting you to not fire back. Or if they're irrational, failing to understand that they will not win. Or if they're not selfish (perhaps the scariest of the possibilities): Perhaps because they are suicidal, which could be considered a sub-class of irrational. Or because they think you will not retaliate against them, instead retaliating against someone else: For example, if through subterfuge the US could fire Pakistani missiles at North Korea, not being dissuaded by North Korea's retaliation against Pakistan because the destruction would be on a different continent, or for example the military or political leadership initiating the attack are in another country, or better yet, on another planet) and not personally harmed by their own country being destroyed. I completely agree that the world would be a safer place if these weapons did not exist. Unfortunately, they do, and we're neither able to modify physics so that they don't, nor to unanimously agree that no use them, so we're stuck with this sub-optimal equilibrium.