4 ms·

For the record, I'm a virtue ethicist (I love Elizabeth Anscombe and, for what it's worth, she was a devout Catholic). And to be clear, I said that good is rea

by dvt 10y ago

For the record, I'm a virtue ethicist (I love Elizabeth Anscombe and, for what it's worth, she was a devout Catholic). And to be clear, I said that good is real (Geach is a great read if you want to find out more about the discussion of 'good'), not that morals are real. You can have a sort of "moral thermometer" built out of all kinds of metrics. Some people are evolutionary moralists (see Dawkins). I frankly just think most of that is nonsense.

naasking 10y ago
> And to be clear, I said that good is real (Geach is a great read if you want to find out more about the discussion of 'good'), not that morals are real. Doing that which is good is moral, so if good is real then morals are real, unless you're a non-cognitivist. > Some people are evolutionary moralists (see Dawkins). I frankly just think most of that is nonsense. It's not nonsense in the sense that evolution can explain our predilection for developing moral beliefs, but the idea that this fact then disproves moral realism is dubious.
- dvt 10y ago
  > Doing that which is good is moral, so if good is real then morals are real, unless you're a non-cognitivist. Yep, but that's not a biconditional. If morals are real, that doesn't necessarily mean good is real. > It's not nonsense in the sense that evolution can explain our predilection for developing moral beliefs, but the idea that this fact then disproves moral realism is dubious. Dawkins doesn't believe evolution merely explains our predilection for developing moral beliefs, he believes morality is driven by certain evolutionary processes. For example, anti-social behavior (e.g. going on a murdering spree) might be "immoral" because it hurts the population as a whole (thereby hurting its propagation), or something along those lines. I think that's a very reductive position, and although analytically satisfying, it doesn't quite capture the intuitive meaning of "good" and "bad".
  - naasking 10y ago
    > Yep, but that's not a biconditional. If morals are real, that doesn't necessarily mean good is real. I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good? > I think that's a very reductive position, and although analytically satisfying, it doesn't quite capture the intuitive meaning of "good" and "bad". Evolutionary game theory ethics is what it's called. But yes, while it can explain natural facts about what we think is good and bad, it can't explain moral facts like what actually is good and bad. I highly recommend you read the paper I linked, because it covers a lot of ground and plenty of common objections against moral realism, even if you decide to stick with theism in the end.
    - dvt 10y ago
      > I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good? If, for example, I use minimizing pain as my moral barometer (this is utilitarianism), I believe in an objective morality without believing in an objective good. I'm not going to punch Jimmy because hurting him that wouldn't be in line with minimizing pain and not because it would be "bad" to do so.
      - naasking 10y ago
        A utilitarian ethics, by definition, is about maximizing or minimizing something. If "pain" is that something, then "pain" is the bad and "not pain" is the good.

by dvt 10y ago

naasking 10y ago

> And to be clear, I said that good is real (Geach is a great read if you want to find out more about the discussion of 'good'), not that morals are real. Doing that which is good is moral, so if good is real then morals are real, unless you're a non-cognitivist. > Some people are evolutionary moralists (see Dawkins). I frankly just think most of that is nonsense. It's not nonsense in the sense that evolution can explain our predilection for developing moral beliefs, but the idea that this fact then disproves moral realism is dubious.

dvt 10y ago
> Doing that which is good is moral, so if good is real then morals are real, unless you're a non-cognitivist. Yep, but that's not a biconditional. If morals are real, that doesn't necessarily mean good is real. > It's not nonsense in the sense that evolution can explain our predilection for developing moral beliefs, but the idea that this fact then disproves moral realism is dubious. Dawkins doesn't believe evolution merely explains our predilection for developing moral beliefs, he believes morality is driven by certain evolutionary processes. For example, anti-social behavior (e.g. going on a murdering spree) might be "immoral" because it hurts the population as a whole (thereby hurting its propagation), or something along those lines. I think that's a very reductive position, and although analytically satisfying, it doesn't quite capture the intuitive meaning of "good" and "bad".
- naasking 10y ago
  > Yep, but that's not a biconditional. If morals are real, that doesn't necessarily mean good is real. I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good? > I think that's a very reductive position, and although analytically satisfying, it doesn't quite capture the intuitive meaning of "good" and "bad". Evolutionary game theory ethics is what it's called. But yes, while it can explain natural facts about what we think is good and bad, it can't explain moral facts like what actually is good and bad. I highly recommend you read the paper I linked, because it covers a lot of ground and plenty of common objections against moral realism, even if you decide to stick with theism in the end.
  - dvt 10y ago
    > I don't see how you can think that. What's an example of a world with objective morality but no objective good? If, for example, I use minimizing pain as my moral barometer (this is utilitarianism), I believe in an objective morality without believing in an objective good. I'm not going to punch Jimmy because hurting him that wouldn't be in line with minimizing pain and not because it would be "bad" to do so.
    - naasking 10y ago
      A utilitarian ethics, by definition, is about maximizing or minimizing something. If "pain" is that something, then "pain" is the bad and "not pain" is the good.