I read Parfit's book Reasons and Persons for a Philosophy class a number of years ago. One large section of the book addressed that age-old question: If you get

I read Parfit's book Reasons and Persons for a Philosophy class a number of years ago. One large section of the book addressed that age-old question: If you get into a Star Trek transporter, do you actually get transported somewhere else? Or do you die, and a new person is created at the destination who is deluded into thinking that they are you? The book was very interesting. I'm not sure that I agree with his conclusion, however, which was (1) Yes, you die. (2) So what? (I.e., there being someone else who is just like you is just as good as not dying.) From my point of view, if the result is just as good as not dying, then that's what I meant by not dying. But I'm sure I'd have to write just as much as Parfit did to make that claim credible to philosophers.