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In a way, he's making an even stronger argument than Searle did in his Chinese Room. Even Searle would probably admit that it's possible in principle for the co
by deong 10y ago
In a way, he's making an even stronger argument than Searle did in his Chinese Room. Even Searle would probably admit that it's possible in principle for the computer in the chinese room argument to fool people into thinking it's intelligent. Searle just objects to the idea that it could ever really be intelligent in the way a human is. To Searle, the human obviously isn't just running some algorithms on the input text to produce output.
I think the counter to Searle's argument isn't really that it doesn't matter as long as the result is close enough. The counter to that is that we don't understand how human intelligence works either. Searle is simply assuming that it's "magic" (or less condescendingly, some sort of metaphysical process) that can't be simulated by algorithmic machine. I think it's far more likely that intelligence is physical and we just don't understand the machinery than it is that it's mystical and cannot in principle ever be understood.
For this article, all that is seemingly unnecessary. He's just saying they won't work well enough to even fake it convincingly. Which is very nearly falsifiable just by running today's algorithms.
- westoncb 10y agoSearle's Chinese Room is addressing something different from intelligence; it's concerned with the what happens /within/ the intelligent mind, whereas inputs and outputs are the only things that matter here. To be more specific, in the question of whether deep learning can be used to generate and/or comprehend natural language, we are not concerned with whether the algorithm is conscious of what it's doing as longs as the results are good.
- visarga 10y agoIn order to be conscious it has to be more than a reactive or feedforward system. It has to loop back on itself, like RNNs, and hold internal state.