4 ms·
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the whole point of the CA system that you only need to send the public key to the CAs? So, unless the NSA possesses some P=N
by xg15 10y ago
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the whole point of the CA system that you only need to send the public key to the CAs?
So, unless the NSA possesses some P=NP level crypto breaking technology, it should be technically impossible for CAs to fake a particular public key, no matter how corrupt/undermined they are.
Of course there a few other more practical things an evil CA can do:
- generate another keypair and create a certificate that claims the key represents <organization of your choice>. Certificate Transparency is supposed to prevent that. Also if the organization gets to know about your fake certificate, prepare for their wrath.
- Offer a service in which you "helpfully" also generate the keypairs for your customers before creating the cert. Now you can simply save a copy of the private key and keep control. That will only work if your customers fall for it though and don't insist on bringing their own keys.