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I took those statements to be suggesting that you should be aware and implement your own security. What do you need the https access for, and why is it irrespon
by dahart 10y ago
I took those statements to be suggesting that you should be aware and implement your own security. What do you need the https access for, and why is it irresponsible to separate the database concerns from the security concerns?
I don't know, but it might be extra responsible of the Redis devs to suggest they shouldn't implement your security for you, and they should stick strictly to databases.
I'm not currently using Redis, but I would like to, and I've looked at it several times recently. Initially, I had nearly the same reaction as you, but now I think I interpret it differently.
I'd assume that you have to wrap any scalable or public Redis access in an API, you will never expose the DB directly, so https would only be used for dev work and for transport between the DB and the API layer. Both of those I would normally implement security around myself, and for API transport it is unlikely to matter when I have the API host and the DB host inside the same network.
I would think that removing Redis from the security equation probably makes a security audit easier and not harder, since you would configure dev access over ssh & share existing keys, reducing the number of entry/failure points. Same for the API transport, if necessary.
- kogepathic 10y ago> I don't know, but it might be extra responsible of the Redis devs to suggest they shouldn't implement your security for you, and they should stick strictly to databases. Do you still agree if I change your statement to: I don't know, but it might be extra responsible of the nginx devs to suggest they shouldn't implement your security for you, and they should stick strictly to HTTP. I would imagine you would not agree, because it's ridiculous to have a web server only supporting HTTP in 2017. This is exactly my argument about Redis. I'm not saying Redis should implement their own crypto. I'm saying it's user hostile to say "We don't support security because perimeter security is infallible and plus no one really cares about security anyway" and you should go use another utility to wrap their socket in SSL. Sure, it's not their job to be security experts, but neither are the: - PostgreSQL developers - openLDAP developers - rsync developers And yet somehow they manage to support SSL within their application. If you read reports about data breaches lately, it's usually the following pattern: - Send a phishing email to someone in the org with malware - Infect their computer - Pivot inside the network and exfiltrate the goodies In this scenario, perimeter security is utterly worthless because the attacker has gotten themselves right into your network. If you have encrypted data between services (e.g. application servers to database, application to redis) then they also have to pop the actual servers to get the data, instead of just sitting on the network and watching traffic go back and forth. People say "oh it's not a big deal, redis is just storing sessions" until someone grabs a session from the app server to the redis server, and then pops your site as an admin.
- dahart 10y ago> I'm saying it's user hostile to say "We don't support security ... " Redis doesn't say that, and you might not want to put quotes around something they didn't say. Here is what they do say: "Redis is designed to be accessed by trusted clients inside trusted environments. This means that usually it is not a good idea to expose the Redis instance directly to the internet or, in general, to an environment where untrusted clients can directly access the Redis TCP port or UNIX socket." "in general, untrusted access to Redis should always be mediated by a layer implementing ACLs, validating user input, and deciding what operations to perform against the Redis instance. In general, Redis is not optimized for maximum security but for maximum performance and simplicity." "Access to the Redis port should be denied to everybody but trusted clients in the network" https://redis.io/topics/security https://redis.io/topics/security That's basically what I assumed, and this is a perfectly valid security model. Just because some other software with different design requirements supports certain connection types doesn't mean Redis needs to, you might want to re-examine your own assumptions. I don't buy the analogy between Redis and nginx because nginx is a web server and Redis is an in-memory database. A better analogy than any you have provided is between Redis and memcached. "The closest analog is probably to think of Redis as Memcached" http://stackoverflow.com/a/7897243/1424242 http://stackoverflow.com/a/7897243/1424242 Memcached also doesn't support encryption, and only very recently basic authentication. Their wiki has language very similar to Redis: "How do I authenticate? You don't! Well, you used to not be able to. Now you can. If your client supports it, you may use SASL authentication to connect to memcached." "Keep in mind that you should do this only if you really need to. On a closed internal network this ends up just being added latency for new connections (if minor)." https://github.com/memcached/memcached/wiki/ProgrammingFAQ#how-do-i-authenticate https://github.com/memcached/memcached/wiki/ProgrammingFAQ#h... "This [SASL authentication] does not provide encryption, but can provide authentication. Do not run this over the internet large, do use this to protect from neighbors and accidents from within large mostly trusted networks." https://github.com/memcached/memcached/wiki/SASLHowto https://github.com/memcached/memcached/wiki/SASLHowto
- eropple 10y agoRelying on firewalls and port-access is a sucker's game. There are too many ways to defeat it that TLS is not susceptible to. This is a fault of Redis. It's good software, on some axes. It's bad software on this one and they really, really should be better citizens about it. Security is a collaborative effort and punting it onto largely-ignorant users does not wash your hands of it.