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> Were Congress to expand tort law to mandate standards and consequences similar to products liability regulations for other products, then the attack surface a
by AnthonyMouse 10y ago
> Were Congress to expand tort law to mandate standards and consequences similar to products liability regulations for other products, then the attack surface available to state and non-state actors would meaningfully shrink.
The problem is the organization sizes are the opposite of what works for products liability. It's not Joe Homeowner buying an appliance from Sears or GE, it's an insurance company or government contractor getting software from an individual or a company with nine employees.
You can't use that to force improvements from small entities because they barely even have lawyers to tell them what they have to do, and nobody will actually sue them if they have no money anyway.
What you need isn't for the software vendor to be liable, it's for the company holding all the customer data to be liable to those customers. Then those companies will start caring about actual security instead of "compliance" and figuring out how to pass the buck, and software vendors will still have to make secure software because nobody will buy anything else anymore.
It also forces companies to start treating huge databases as the security liability that they are. And it conveniently applies to the large tech companies that are also data warehousing companies like Yahoo or LinkedIn/Microsoft.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"it's an insurance company or government contractor getting software from an individual or a company with nine employees." The good news is high-assurance systems have been built with smaller teams than that. We also have cases like Bernstein's where one person builds all kinds of stuff with provably better security using a bit of brains and methods that work. We also have tools like SPARK for static systems and Rust/Eiffel for larger ones that can easily eliminate entire classes of attack. Ada & SPARK have been around decades. Eiffel over a decade. Hardly anyone in security-critical space using them. Most of what you see is easily prevented. Even with small teams. They just don't care or try. A baseline stopping code injection or insecure configurations would knock out a ton of problems. The next thing that would happen, as did with DO-178B regulation & TCSEC, would be reusable components and consulting services designed to meet the standard where the cost & limited expertise is spread among many customers. It could be done. Even for smaller players to a large degree. "What you need isn't for the software vendor to be liable, it's for the company holding all the customer data to be liable to those customers." Doesn't solve the DDOS problem which can also be used for extortion, interfering with government operations, etc. My approach targeting root cause handles that, too.
- AnthonyMouse 10y agoOh absolutely, it isn't that small teams can't create secure software, it's that product liability isn't the way to do it. Because when the lawyers come for the bad coders they just turn their pockets inside out and then go back to writing bad code, while all the HMOs carry on using OpenSSL and vulnerable XML parsers. > Doesn't solve the DDOS problem which can also be used for extortion, interfering with government operations, etc. My approach targeting root cause handles that, too. Can you be more specific about your DDOS solution?
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"Can you be more specific about your DDOS solution?" The root cause is 0-days in software or bad configuration of mass-market products in most cases. The former can be detected automatically by many tools. The latter can, given the flaws I've seen so far, be spotted in 5 minute review by an amateur consultant. Mandating such things in a regulation or expecting them as "reasonable, professional standard" during a lawsuit would be a start. Prevents many DDOS bots as a side-effect. My main solution to DDOS mitigation in the interim & part of long-term package is here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13266108 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13266108
- cstejerean 10y agoFor every piece of softare they buy from a 9 person ISV they probably run tens of millions of dollars of software from IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, Adobe, etc. Or custom made software developed by one of the large shops. And that's going to be the vast majority of the attack surface.
- AnthonyMouse 10y ago> For every piece of softare they buy from a 9 person ISV they probably run tens of millions of dollars of software from IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, Adobe, etc. Or custom made software developed by one of the large shops. And that's going to be the vast majority of the attack surface. Vulnerabilities are not proportional to software price. That's the whole problem. IBM software is very expensive and complicated but you don't see a lot of CVEs. OpenSSL costs no money and much trouble. Yet you have projects like OpenSSH that are free, by all accounts have a strong security record, but once or twice a decade there is a serious vulnerability. And because of how and where it's used, liability for that would destroy them. Meanwhile Adobe would sooner stop distributing Flash Player than fix it, and all this does nothing about the admin who leaves the database server open to the internet with the default password.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]