5 ms·
Not unless you MITM the connection, otherwise it wouldn't be an effective measure. There's a pretty good write up I found here: https://trac.torproject.org/pr
by subliminalpanda 10y ago
Not unless you MITM the connection, otherwise it wouldn't be an effective measure.
There's a pretty good write up I found here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
commit for the ios version is here:
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/SignalServiceKit/commit/78515377b14f1055c4a87548a7899650b753ce52 https://github.com/WhisperSystems/SignalServiceKit/commit/78...
- smartbit 10y agoThanks for the links, informative. So the proxy app that the Egypt government would like to take down is signal-reflector-meek.appspot.com
- kijiki 10y agoNo, per the linked check-in, the Egyptian govt would have to block OWSCensorshipConfigurationFrontingHost, which is "https://google.com" https://google.com". That is the domain looked up in DNS and included in the TLS Certificate's SNI field. These are the only domains that are sent plain-text. "signal-reflector-meek.appspot.com" domain only shows up in the HTTP "Host" header, which is TLS encrypted, and thus not visible to the censors.