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The Communist Party is not a monolith -- policy disagreements are proxies for factional struggles. They just don't usually play out in a very public way, but ev
by smallnamespace 10y ago
The Communist Party is not a monolith -- policy disagreements are proxies for factional struggles. They just don't usually play out in a very public way, but even in China, different news sources will have a different 'spin' because they represent different viewpoints within the Party.
Xi is well aware of the need for financial, institutional, and economic liberalization (the government has been regularly downsizing and selling off state-owned firms[1] as well as opening up the financial sector), but support for these policies is not uniform within the Party because many within benefit from the status quo.
Hence the contradiction -- in order to push forward a liberalization and anti-corruption agenda, Xi must first suppress dissent within the Party. In the US, we have the saying 'Only Nixon could go to China'.
It's basically walking a tightrope: if he uses authoritarian tools too heavily, then that indirectly hurts the independent institutions that need to be nurtured, but if he takes too light a hand, then reforms will be blocked or delayed indefinitely at lower levels and then fail from a thousand cuts.
And if China reforms too quickly without careful planning, it risks chaos (see former Soviet Union in the 90s). If it reforms too slowly, it will not be able to generate the economic growth that it badly needs as the manufacturing and real estate sectors slow down.
[1] http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-allow-state-owned-enterprises-to-sell-shares-to-public-1442138335 http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-allow-state-owned-enter...
- diego_moita 10y ago> Xi is well aware of the need for financial, institutional, and economic liberalization I am not sure about this. Since 2008 the Party seems to be panicking by increasing social unrest on ethnic/religious issues (Tibet/Xinjiang), on autonomy ( Hong Kong ) and, in thousands of villages and cities, on corruption, land rights and environmental issues. But I do concede that he has been effective in important issues (e.g.: healthcare and pensions). China history is marked by 30-40 years of calm and tranquility that suddenly erupt in tragic conflict (Taiping Rebellion, Republic, Communist Revolution, Great Leap Forward & Cultural Revolution, ...) By that pattern some big instability is overdue by now. Let's just hope it doesn't happen.
- smallnamespace 10y agoThe argument for liberalization is that it's the only way to continue to grow the economy, and the Communist's Party's current legitimacy rests on lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the last few decades. Having won a revolution only some 70 years before, Party leaders are well aware that power taken with consent of the people can certainly be taken away again [1][2]. [1] http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1133212/tocquevilles-advice-french-revolution-captures-chinese-leaders-attention http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1133212/tocquevilles-... [2] http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Communist-Party-s-recommended-books-show-China-s-leadership-concerns http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Comm...
- jessaustin 10y agoSure, from the outside we can't know the exact motivations and constraints of internal disputes. Still, this seems a very generous interpretation. China's recent situation is better on pretty much any measure than it was post-Mao, and much better than that in USSR post-Brezhnev. Both Gorbachev and Deng (whose latter accomplishments, incidentally, seem in retrospect to be closer to what Gorbachev and the rest of the Politburo had in mind than Gorbachev's actual results) dealt with larger challenges in mostly less autocratic fashion.