5 ms·
OK... but none of that sounds like it would result in deliberately introducing security flaws of the sort under discussion here. Let's not forget the context o
by lisper 10y ago
OK... but none of that sounds like it would result in deliberately introducing security flaws of the sort under discussion here. Let's not forget the context of this discussion:
"Some researchers have even speculated, especially since the disclosures by Edward Snowden, that commercial hardware sources could be subtly manipulated to make the codes easier to break by the U.S. National Security Agency or others." [Emphasis added]
Obviously such attacks are possible, but are they likely? I can see how the cat-and-mouse game of IP protection would lead to all kinds of dirty tricks, but what would be the profit in introducing a backdoor that could be leveraged to break crypto or an RNG?
- Cyph0n 10y agoI remember reading that the Linux kernel does not use Intel's hardware RNG alone for /dev/(u)random precisely because of concerns that Intel has backdoored the RNG.
- lisper 10y agoYes, that's true, and that is a legitimate concern. I personally would not trust Intel's RNG because it is implemented in a way that deliberately hides some of the underlying implementation in a way that would make it impossible to tell if it's backdoored. That is my original point: it is much harder to tell if hardware has a back door than software.
- Cyph0n 10y agoBut does this not provide an example of an intentional backdoor in a hardware RNG? I'm actually going to be diving into the literature on hardware verification, with a focus on how to design IP that can be objectively verified by a third-party. If I find something good, I might even do my PhD on this topic.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoThis is the kind of tangential thinking tptacek apparently fell for in the BitBabbler discussion. While they were talking Intel RNG's, I was focusing on the fact that Intel advertises a chip-level backdoor w/ its own TCP/IP stack & MCU that listens even when CPU is shutdown. It's called AMT. That he knew about it but focused on risk of their TRNG when whole chip is backdoored is beyond my understanding. Here it is in case you weren't familiar with its specifics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Techno... Also, as in my recent reply to lisper, the hooks that make it work are probably in all the chips of any family containing at least one with that technology. That's to reduce mask and production costs. They might be able to remotely activate it but can't know cuz it's a black box. :)
- lisper 10y ago> But does this not provide an example of an intentional backdoor in a hardware RNG? I don't know. No one knows outside of Intel. That's the whole point. In fact, it's possible that even inside Intel no one knows because a backdoor could have been surreptitiously inserted by a rogue engineer working for, say, the Chinese government, who has since left the company! I have no idea whether Intel's internal design review processes are thorough enough to prevent this. For someone who knew what they were doing and who was in a position to influence the design to insert a back door without being noticed would not be particularly hard. > I might even do my PhD on this topic. Good luck! Keep us posted.
- Cyph0n 10y agoAh yes, the insider threat is probably the toughest issue to deal with. At this point, I guess we can only hope that the RNG isn't backdoored. Thank you. I'll be sure to post something to HN once I've made some progress. That will take time though.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoJust saw your line about HW verification. That was my last project. Mostly done with it. I came up with a few ways to do it but you always need or leak source. No way to do it with gates only so far. There's potential but I wouldnt trust it. The standard cells will take mutually-suspicious parties reviewing by eye with expertise in analog and RF. Email me and I'll send you some stuff. Summaries first then anywhere from a few to a pile of papers with specifics.
- Cyph0n 10y agoInteresting! Thanks, that would be really helpful! I'll email you today. I was thinking of somehow combining a form of signature computation at each level (layout, schematic, RTL) with some low-overhead logic sprinkled throughout the circuit. The issue is mainly how and where to place the logic, but I'm hoping to get some ideas as I read through prior work.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"Obviously such attacks are possible, but are they likely? I can see how the cat-and-mouse game of IP protection would lead to all kinds of dirty tricks, but what would be the profit in introducing a backdoor that could be leveraged to break crypto or an RNG?" You get paid directly by the parties wanting it. That's what Crypto AG did for NSA a long time ago. They weren't making enough money so they risked whole business on a large sum of money to cripple machines sent to specific parties. The Snowden leaks quite clearly say this is going on domestically and with foreign companies although not clear on what (i.e. hardware) they're sabotaging to break the crypto: https://theintercept.com/document/2014/10/10/national-initiative-protection-program-sentry-eagle/ https://theintercept.com/document/2014/10/10/national-initia... For the locals, they paid between $30-80 million in one time fees to "SIGINT-enable" them per other leaks. Foreign nation-states, esp China, stay doing this sort of thing but usually with human assets working for the company to plant stuff. Now back to hardware. You're probably having a hard time imagining how it would look or even make sense commercially outside a shady deal with No Such Agency. The first example was a wireless communications in non-online device. The embedded system just needed a cheap SOC. The engineers decided on an integrated one that was used in budget mobiles and data collection since they were already getting them dirt cheap for the phones. The RTOS was of course an insecure one common in embedded. Totally justified by the fact it was an offline device. The device could be hit with a software flaw that would enable remote access or location tracking via that silicon users had no knowledge of. In this case, though, they were just doing it to save development time & maybe quarters to dollars on each device. Hardware guy said this stuff wasn't unusual due to three trends in ASIC development: 1. Need to add features to increase competitiveness. 2. Need to reduce number of new designs or components to keep costs down (esp mask costs). 3. Need to offer multiple tiers of capabilities and pricing on products ideally not paying for each individual one. Hiding existing functionality they already bought or built in others is the natural solution to this. It's why 3G chips might be in CPU's or MCU's (eg Intel's ARC) might be in chips you didn't know had them. The hard disk companies are one of few that got caught doing it in that it's cheaper to mass-produce (for example) 1TB platters for all HD's of given model than many different platters. They just had a firmware or hardware setting in the chip to make it pretend to be lower space that they charged less for. AMD's triple-cores were another that was more open & reasonable where they were quad-cores with one defective core. They just turned it off then sold them as cheaper triple-cores. On mobile side, Shenzhen takes the cake with them cloning, modifying, and reselling anything you can think of. Their fake iPhone hit the Chinese market before the iPhone did officially at a fraction of the price. I'll let you wonder of security implications of high-ranking laypersons in business using an iPhone without any of its protection mechanisms built-in to CPU & OS. This doesn't even count all the counterfeit Chinese chips in U.S. products and military gear DOD reported on. The weaknesses are already there. They're there for commercial rather than surveillance reasons. Many benefit the surveillance state with those parties bribing or coercing the companies to enable them for SIGINT. In some cases, like with RSA, they introduce backdoors directly for money that had no plausible explanation of benefit. Intel's chip-level backdoor, AMT, is sold as great for management & runs even when CPU is "off." Probably nothing to worry about. ;) Hardware business is shady, dude. I can't tell you who is attacking, how much, and so on. Whole industry is full of NDA's from all the shit they pull. It's a black box outside the things above that leaked out.