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I agree that trusting the manufacturer of the fab would constitute a potential attack vector, but if the fab was capable of reproducing itself (in conjunction w
by kibwen 10y ago
I agree that trusting the manufacturer of the fab would constitute a potential attack vector, but if the fab was capable of reproducing itself (in conjunction with other tools, of course) then persistent subversion of the fab would be analogous to a trusting-trust attack. And just like trusting-trust attacks can be satisfactorily mitigated (e.g. via diverse compilation), so could a trusted hardware toolchain eventually be produced. The question then is just whether such a thing is worth the large effort. :)
- pjc50 10y agoI think you're underestimating the cost of building a fab by several orders of magnitude.
- kibwen 10y agoThis is a hypothetical far-future question, I'm not here expecting anything like this in my lifetime. :)
- Cyph0n 10y agoThe raw resources alone - not considering the labor and technology - required to build a fab and maintain it are so staggering that I just can't see that happening anytime soon. Besides, the fab itself isn't the issue. Rather, the equipment used during the fabrication process itself are the weakest link, so to speak. Further, if we consider the feasibility of insider attacks, the people who maintain the fab are potential targets as well. So, I think achieving what you propose would require: 1) access to an immense amount of resources, 2) the capability to self-manufacture the tools required to manufacture ICs, and 3) an AI that can operate the fab. The third point alone is so far off that I'd conclude it's going to be impossible for a long time.