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"non-federated" and "secure" in the same sentence is a joke. Signal's other problem is Google Play Services which has absolutely no place in a supposedly secure
by ddevault 10y ago
"non-federated" and "secure" in the same sentence is a joke. Signal's other problem is Google Play Services which has absolutely no place in a supposedly secure system.
- sliken 10y agoWhy? Google doesn't know who you are chatting with, or even the size of the messages you are sending. Google just sends a "wake up signal and check for messages". That's it.
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoKeep reading the thread.
- tptacek 10y agoYour argument on this thread is incoherent. You begin by suggesting that GCM is problematic because it's a component of a larger platform library that gives Google control of Android phones. When it's pointed out that GCM push can be supported without that platform library, your argument shifts: it's the messages themselves that are dangerous. When it's pointed out to you that the messages are empty, you invent a scenario in which GCM push messages enable a kind of traffic analysis that on-the-wire traffic analysis can't already accomplish. Were this my argument, rather than pointing me to a thread where my points were continually and reliably refuted, I'd take this opportunity to instead restate my argument clearly.
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoI think you're misinterpreting my arguments because it suits your preconceptions if that were the case. GCM is not just client code. I clarified when someone said the client could be replaced.
- tptacek 10y agoSame issue, and here's Moxie himself on it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13054940#13056554 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13054940#13056554
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoI have read this; I don't generally comment on issues I'm not informed on. Moxie is simply wrong on many of these points, and has been for a while and has had this repeatedly pointed out with no change in opinion. I would rehash this here but you'd be better off simply reading the linked thread and looking at other rebuttals. In particular I remember a 500+ comment GitHub thread on the Play Services issue where Moxie was repeatedly dismissive and rude to those who take issue with the glaring security problems in Signal.
- tptacek 10y ago"The glaring security problems in Signal"?
- tptacek 10y agoSignal's use of GCM has also been beaten to death: it's a platform issue that has no impact on security (but does make it harder to deploy Signal on nonstandard Android platforms).
- Sir_Cmpwn 10y agoThat is not true. It's (1) a remotely exploitable rootkit and (2) a tracking system that's (3) operated by a multi-billion dollar company whose entire business model is invading your privacy. Google Play Services is not the standard Android platform. AOSP is the standard Android platform.
- dublinben 10y agoYou're conflating GCM and the wider Google Play Services that is installed on most Android devices. As someone who actually uses AOSP without Google, it weakens your argument when you conflate the two.
- ajamesm 10y agoFederation concerns availability, not security. "unplug the ethernet and write plaintext to /dev/null" is extraordinarily secure and 100% decentralized, though badly unavailable.
- Forbo 10y agoIt can also affect security depending on what jurisdiction the servers fall under. Federation means that while it may be illegal to run the service in, say, China, it can be run elsewhere without those concerns. This is becoming more apparent with the widespread use of National Security Letters.
- ajamesm 10y agoSorry, am I missing something? It's my understanding that Signal is ETE encrypted. All an NSL would get you is ciphertext and metadata.
- Forbo 10y agoThe scenario I'm imagining is that Google and OWS receive NSLs requiring them to push a modified APK that could do nefarious things.
- hkt 10y agoThis does somewhat break Signal's security model..
- sliken 10y agoGoogle can't push a new Signal APK, it's signed by OWS, not google. 3rd parties can download the signal source and compile it. Not sure if there's enough information available to product a bit identical (and thus verifiable binary). I guess a NSL might compel OWS to push a binary specifically for a targetted user. If that's in your threat model you definitely need to take additional steps.
- 10y ago