5 ms·

Tufte wrote an essay on how the data available suggested that there was a high likelihood of O-ring failure, but that the data and findings were poorly communic

Tufte wrote an essay on how the data available suggested that there was a high likelihood of O-ring failure, but that the data and findings were poorly communicated. This led to the decision to launch, the subsequent failure of the O-rings and loss of life. This essay appears in the booklet "Visual and Statistical Thinking"[0], among other publications, along with an other essay on how the source of cholera was traced to contaminated drinking water in 19th century London by John Snow. He plotted cholera cases on a map, and looked at where the outbreaks were most frequent.[1] This also led to the discovery of the vector of cholera, which up until then was unknown or at least misattributed. Both are great reads. [0]: https://www.sfu.ca/cmns/courses/2012/801/1-Readings/Tufte%20Visual%20and%20Statistical%20Thinking.pdf https://www.sfu.ca/cmns/courses/2012/801/1-Readings/Tufte%20... [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1854_Broad_Street_cholera_outbreak#/media/File:Snow-cholera-map-1.jpg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1854_Broad_Street_cholera_outb...

justin66 10y ago
Some of the engineers at Thiokol whose work Tufte criticized have responded over the years. There's at least one painfully academic paper out there, although if you wanted to you could start here: http://www.onlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/Exemplars/BehavingWell/RB-intro/RepMisrep.aspx#misrep http://www.onlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/Exemplars/Be... https://eagereyes.org/criticism/tufte-and-the-truth-about-the-challenger https://eagereyes.org/criticism/tufte-and-the-truth-about-th... It's been longer since I read Feynman but I recall his assessment as being a lot more grounded, and fairer to the engineers.
- masklinn 10y ago
  > It's been longer since I read Feynman but I recall his assessment as being a lot more grounded, and fairer to the engineers. Feynman laid the vast majority of the blame on management ("NASA officials" in his Appendix F), noting that engineers had fairly realistic views of the matter (and failure rate estimates) and IIRC that they'd tried to raise concerns but those had gotten lost climbing the manglement ladder. The one unit for which he had nothing but praise was the Software Group: > To summarize then, the computer software checking system and attitude is of the highest quality. There appears to be no process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards so characteristic of the Solid Rocket Booster or Space Shuttle Main Engine safety systems. Nothing that they had to constantly resist manglement trying to mangle: > To be sure, there have been recent suggestions by management to curtail such elaborate and expensive tests as being unnecessary at this late date in Shuttle history.
  - alephnil 10y ago
    > Nothing that they had to constantly resist manglement trying to mangle: Such a failure to hold up standard was the main reason for the failure of the first Ariane 5 launch. They reused some subsystems from the Ariane 4 rocket, that crashed on Ariane 5 because a numeric overflow. This happened because the much more powerful Ariane 5 came much further during the time this subsystem ran, and had a greater angle that caused the overflow to happen. This had apparently been proven could not happen in the Ariane 4 rocket. When the subsystem and its software was decided to be used on Ariane 5, they did not even run the subsystem with the projected trajectory of the new rocket. If they had the problem would have been found prior to launch. This was luckily not a manned mission.
    - Baeocystin 10y ago
      >When the subsystem and its software was decided to be used on Ariane 5, they did not even run the subsystem with the projected trajectory of the new rocket. On one hand, I find that incredibly hard to believe. Yet on the other I am old enough to have seen exactly that kind of thinking often enough that I don't find it hard to believe at all.

justin66 10y ago

Some of the engineers at Thiokol whose work Tufte criticized have responded over the years. There's at least one painfully academic paper out there, although if you wanted to you could start here: http://www.onlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/Exemplars/BehavingWell/RB-intro/RepMisrep.aspx#misrep http://www.onlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/Exemplars/Be... https://eagereyes.org/criticism/tufte-and-the-truth-about-the-challenger https://eagereyes.org/criticism/tufte-and-the-truth-about-th... It's been longer since I read Feynman but I recall his assessment as being a lot more grounded, and fairer to the engineers.

masklinn 10y ago
> It's been longer since I read Feynman but I recall his assessment as being a lot more grounded, and fairer to the engineers. Feynman laid the vast majority of the blame on management ("NASA officials" in his Appendix F), noting that engineers had fairly realistic views of the matter (and failure rate estimates) and IIRC that they'd tried to raise concerns but those had gotten lost climbing the manglement ladder. The one unit for which he had nothing but praise was the Software Group: > To summarize then, the computer software checking system and attitude is of the highest quality. There appears to be no process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards so characteristic of the Solid Rocket Booster or Space Shuttle Main Engine safety systems. Nothing that they had to constantly resist manglement trying to mangle: > To be sure, there have been recent suggestions by management to curtail such elaborate and expensive tests as being unnecessary at this late date in Shuttle history.
- alephnil 10y ago
  > Nothing that they had to constantly resist manglement trying to mangle: Such a failure to hold up standard was the main reason for the failure of the first Ariane 5 launch. They reused some subsystems from the Ariane 4 rocket, that crashed on Ariane 5 because a numeric overflow. This happened because the much more powerful Ariane 5 came much further during the time this subsystem ran, and had a greater angle that caused the overflow to happen. This had apparently been proven could not happen in the Ariane 4 rocket. When the subsystem and its software was decided to be used on Ariane 5, they did not even run the subsystem with the projected trajectory of the new rocket. If they had the problem would have been found prior to launch. This was luckily not a manned mission.
  - Baeocystin 10y ago
    >When the subsystem and its software was decided to be used on Ariane 5, they did not even run the subsystem with the projected trajectory of the new rocket. On one hand, I find that incredibly hard to believe. Yet on the other I am old enough to have seen exactly that kind of thinking often enough that I don't find it hard to believe at all.