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But if there's no payout then there's no incentive to say don't know. Whereas if there is a payout then the optimal strategy is clearly "dont know", assuming eq
by throwaway729 10y ago
But if there's no payout then there's no incentive to say don't know. Whereas if there is a payout then the optimal strategy is clearly "dont know", assuming equal payouts for correct and dont know. Why would you take the risk of being wrong?
- hx87 10y agoQuote from paper: > The amount paid for “don’t know” responses was also assigned randomly, and was a fraction of the amount offered for a correct response: 20% of the payment for a correct response with probability .33, 25% with probability .33, and 33% with probability .33.
- throwaway729 10y agoThanks, that's exactly what I was looking for but it's hard on a phone. Qwrusz's comment may be relevant here.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]