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I would agree with the analysis that "At the very least ... the government is absolutely in the clear to compel you to enter your passcode and not reveal what i
by munchbunny 10y ago
I would agree with the analysis that "At the very least ... the government is absolutely in the clear to compel you to enter your passcode and not reveal what it is."
As a matter of policy, I can think of three important principles at play:
* If we want encryption that the government and the tech companies themselves cannot decrypt without your consent, then the passcode is the only way to get in.
* The justice system should have a way to see inside locked places if it reasonably believes that there is important/relevant evidence inside.
* The person who might be coerced to give up the passcode is likely the only person who knows the passcode.
I can't think of a better compromise that lets you have all three things without some sort of compromise, and a combination of compelling you to open the box without revealing the passcode as well as some limits on how much the government can examine once inside seems like the best balance.
- paulddraper 10y agoExactly. The government can compel you to open a gun safe, and they can compel you to login to your computer. Those are both pieces of "evidence" not "testimony" (or as much as there can be a difference).
- geofft 10y agoHmmm. I agree with this more than I thought I would have. I think the real thing here is that the reason to protect against self-incrimination is really a protection against abuses of the justice system, against the ability for judges to force false confessions out of people. If you somehow knew that that a piece of testimony would be guaranteed honest and guaranteed uncoerced, is there still an argument for not requiring you to testify about it, just because it's about yourself? I think we're left with diafygi's argument about muscle memory, that a suspect may have literally forgotten the passcode and the courts shouldn't be able to say "No you didn't."